

**Edna Bonacich
Robert F. Goodman**

**Deadlock in
School Desegregation**
A Case Study of
Inglewood, California

PRAEGER SPECIAL STUDIES IN U.S. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL ISSUES

The Praeger Special Studies program—utilizing the most modern and efficient book production techniques and a selective worldwide distribution network—makes available to the academic, government, and community significant timely

. . . we believe that part of the educational desirability of any plan at this time must be its mutual acceptance by both minority groups and whites. It should be obvious, but does not always appear to be, that integration is impossible without white pupils. No plan can be acceptable, therefore, which increases the movement of white pupils out of the public schools.

The Allen Report on New York City Schools

PRAEGER PUBLISHERS

111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003, U.S.A.
5, Cromwell Place, London S.W.7, England

Published in the United States of America in 1972
by Praeger Publishers, Inc.

All rights reserved

© 1972 by Praeger Publishers, Inc.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 70-180845

Printed in the United States of America

PREFACE

The research reported in this book was conducted originally for another purpose. Our intent was to develop a simulation game incorporating elements of school district policy conflict. Inglewood was an ideal location for the field work that was required. It was, at that time, in the midst of a serious desegregation controversy and was only a 20-minute drive from our office at System Development Corporation (SDC) in Santa Monica. We contacted the school district, explained our purposes, and were afforded full cooperation.

After completing the field work, we constructed a simulation called "The SDC School System Crisis Simulation." In the process, however, it became clear that our understanding of the events in Inglewood was beginning to diverge quite significantly from some of the major themes in the literature on school desegregation. We therefore felt that it might be useful to try to state our position in the form of a brief case study. The project became more lengthy and involved as we proceeded, culminating in this book.

By the fall of 1971 such internal desegregation conflicts were becoming less important as local and federal courts ordered communities around the country to desegregate. We think, however, that our study is not only of historical interest; it can also contribute to an understanding of some of the implications of court-ordered desegregation, since the latter shares certain of the characteristics of what we have called preemptive decision-making. Court activism has contributed to the development of a very ugly national issue that, at this writing, has led to the call for an antibussing constitutional amendment.

The project was a group effort, and we wish to thank the friends with whom we worked. Robert Meeker helped develop the simulation and contributed some of the ideas that have found their way into this book. David Benor and Bruce Clary were valuable research assistants, playing a far more important role than the title suggests. Harry Silberman, formerly head of the Educational Systems Department at SDC, provided financial, administrative, and psychological support for the project.

We want also to thank the citizens and school leaders of Inglewood who so graciously cooperated with us. We are particularly indebted to David Reiss, who helped us in every phase of the field work, and Jim Strong and Larry Gentile, who have taught us much about Inglewood and its citizens.

Since it is not possible here to describe the ways in which Pearlie Goodman and Phil Bonacich have helped this book come to fruition, a simple thank you must suffice.

April 1972

Edna Bonacich
Robert F. Goodman

CONTENTS

PREFACE	vi
LISTS OF TABLES AND MAPS	x
Chapter	
1 INTRODUCTION	3
The Politics of Desegregation: Previous Research	4
Inglewood's Situation: An Alternative Approach	9
Framework for Analysis	11
Methods	13
2 DEMOGRAPHIC BASES OF THE CONFLICT	15
A Declining Economy	15
The Character and Ethnic Composition of Neighborhoods	18
Black In-Migration and White Reaction	21
Efforts to Stabilize Morningside	23
Prospects	26
3 THE SCHOOLS	29
De Facto Segregation	29
Causes of Rapid School Resegregation	32
White Concerns and Fears	33
Changes in the East Side Schools	34
Academic Performance	34
Curriculum	35
Student Race Relations	38
Discipline and Juvenile Delinquency	40
Conclusions	44
4 INTEREST GROUPS	46
Prodesegregation Groups	47
Inglewood Neighbors	47
Parents Interested in Education	50
Citizens for the Three Rs	52

Chapter	Page
The Middle Ground	53
The PTA	55
The Chamber of Commerce	56
The Inglewood Teachers Association	57
Antidesegregation Groups	58
The Neighborhood Schools Advocates	58
Conclusions	64
5 THE POLITICAL DEADLOCK	66
The School Board and Superintendent	66
The Course of the Controversy	68
The Human Relations Approach, 1965-67	68
The Bureau of Intergroup Relations Report	
Triggers Conflict, 1967	68
The Citizens Advisory Committee Produces a	
Second Desegregation Crisis, 1968-69	72
The New Board Faces Immediate Crisis	78
Analysis	80
Traditional Decision-Making Style	80
The Traditional Approach Applied to the	
Desegregation Issue	82
Political Efforts	84
6 ALTERNATIVES	86
Strategic Choices	87
Participatory Decision-Making	89
Some Bases for Compromise	93
Conclusions	93
POSTSCRIPT	95
NOTES	98
APPENDIX: METHODOLOGICAL NOTE ON OVER-	
LAPPING BOUNDARIES	103
BIBLIOGRAPHY	105
ABOUT THE AUTHORS	108

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1 Total Population and Percent Black, Neighborhoods of Inglewood Unified School District, 1970	19
2 Indicators of Socioeconomic Status of Neighborhoods of Inglewood Unified School District, 1960, 1969, and 1970	20
3 Black Enrollment in Inglewood Schools, 1966-69	30
4 Percentage of Students in Ability-Grouped Classes Who Are Black, Morningside High, 1967	36
5 Increase in Proportion of Blacks in Inglewood Schools Between 1970 and 1971	97

LIST OF MAPS

Map	Page
1 Major Streets and Neighborhoods of the Inglewood Unified School District	17
2 Schools of the Inglewood Unified School District	31

Deadlock in School Desegregation

The issue of de facto school desegregation in the North has now reached a position on America's social agenda equal in importance to the de jure segregation of southern schools that has been debated and fought over for nearly two decades. While it is already clear that prospects for successful desegregation of many northern cities are not sanguine, there is optimism in some quarters that small suburban cities in the North can be desegregated successfully.¹ As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights put it:

Most small cities have relatively small Negro populations. In addition, small cities generally have relatively small areas of high-density Negro population. Thus, desegregation may not require as substantial an adjustment in the distances which students must travel to school as may be required to accomplish desegregation of students in a larger city. For these reasons, it may be easier in smaller cities to achieve desegregation by devices such as strategic site selection, redistricting, or the enlargement of attendance zones.²

This study investigates a small western city with de facto segregated schools that experienced a desegregation controversy. Inglewood, California, is a city of roughly 97,000 population located adjacent to Los Angeles. The study focuses upon events that occurred in the community between 1965 and 1969. During that period a substantial number of black students came into the school district but were concentrated in about one-third of the schools.

The district encompasses only a nine-square-mile area and is fiscally sound. Technical impediments to desegregation are not insurmountable. In addition to advantages of scale Inglewood is

characterized by another factor that should make school desegregation feasible: the black population of the city is overwhelmingly middle class. Since the typical strong association between race and class is not present, Inglewood would appear to be in a doubly advantageous position.

Yet, during the period of the study the school board of the Inglewood Unified School District was not able to solve the problem. Indeed, severe conflict raged in the community over the schools until responsibility for a solution was finally given over to the courts by the school board, a virtual admission of defeat. This book examines the reasons for this failure and suggests some alternatives that might have been chosen. It is hoped that similar suburban communities may benefit from the experience of Inglewood. In the process the authors hope to contribute to a deeper understanding of the problems surrounding race relations in American metropolitan areas.

THE POLITICS OF DESEGREGATION: PREVIOUS RESEARCH

In the last decade substantial numbers of school districts have openly faced the problem of de facto segregation. Some have responded voluntarily with bold plans to correct racial imbalance in the schools; some have shown varying degrees of indecision; and some have chosen to ignore the issue until forced by the courts or state governments to deal with it. Given this variation in response, social scientists have attempted to determine why some districts desegregate their schools voluntarily while others do not. Often underlying this query is a more normative one: What can be done to get more school districts to desegregate? While some attention has been paid to the sociological (e.g., social class)³ and social psychological (e.g., attitudes about race) correlates of moves to desegregate, the most coherent body of literature has concentrated on the politics of school desegregation. This is not unreasonable since emphasis has been placed on the decision to desegregate, an essentially political activity. Studies that focus on the decision to desegregate are grounded on the assumption that desegregating the schools is an important step toward integrating the entire society. To simplify the argument considerably, two principle mechanisms are generally proposed, as follows.

First, desegregated schools are supposed to improve the educational opportunity of minority children, thereby helping to equalize their chances for social mobility.⁴ Once class differences are eradicated, one of the most severe hindrances to acceptance of blacks by whites will have been removed.⁵

Second, de facto school segregation is seen, in part, to be a product of residential patterns, and both forms of segregation have the effect of limiting the opportunities for normal social intercourse between blacks and whites. Social separation has increased misunderstanding and the tendency for the races to see each other in categorical and stereotyped terms. A "vicious circle" is established.⁶ School desegregation is a way to break into the circle. When children of both racial groups are brought together, they will find that members of the opposite group are complex individuals like themselves, people who cannot be understood as categories. Getting to know and understand members of the other group will lead to increased liking.⁷ Having learned this lesson, the children, it is hoped, will take it home and pass it on to their parents. But if not, at least the next generation will show meaningful changes.⁸

The decision to desegregate and the implementation of a desegregation plan set this "system" in motion. Of course no one is naive enough to believe that all the rest will follow smoothly. The decision should be accompanied by such support devices as compensatory programs, in-service training for teachers to help them deal with potential problems, curriculum changes to aid minority students in developing a sense of personal and group worth, and so on. While some authors recognize that the decision to desegregate may not result in very large changes for the majority of pupils,⁹ it is still felt to be an important step toward an integrated society. The decision to desegregate the schools represents a major hurdle on the road to social integration.

The most influential school of thought on the politics of desegregation is associated with authors such as Robert Crain, Morton Inger, and Robert Stout.¹⁰ These writers do not necessarily agree with each other on all points, but a composite picture can be drawn from their work suggesting what they view to be the important variables affecting the likelihood of a decision in favor of school desegregation and what prescriptions they put forward to achieve this end.

First, these studies find that school boards that open the desegregation decision to public debate provoke community conflict.¹¹ Opening the decision leads to a mobilization of opposition forces. People who are normally indifferent are forced to choose sides. The community becomes polarized.

Second, community conflict makes the decision-making process much more difficult. According to Stout,

a board of education creates a decision vacuum. This tends to be filled by competing interest groups all of whom want to convince the board that they really represent the community . . . Such competition quickly evolves to a

contest in which only the extreme positions are represented . . . Having thus deferred to the public, the school board is in the untenable position of being unable to define the particular position which it will take. Given the competing views, how is the board to decide what the "public" wants? . . . When the board attempts to regain its responsibility to decide the issue it often is accused of tyranny and duplicity, accusations which render many boards immobile.¹²

Thus, opening the decision to the public leads ultimately to a higher probability of indecision.

A third proposition is that keeping the decision firmly in the hands of the board avoids community conflict, even if the board acts in a way that is initially unpopular with large segments of the community. This is because it is possible for the board to define the issue of school desegregation as a strictly educational matter over which it has legitimate authority to make policy decisions. For most people, especially those who are not deeply involved in school affairs, the decisions made by legitimate governmental authorities are accepted. The strong opponents of school desegregation are left isolated, unable to invoke the participation of the "silent majority" against the constituted authorities. As one author puts it, "desegregation itself brings its own *fait accompli* acceptance . . . public opinion accommodates itself to the new arrangements after the fact."¹³

This approach is grounded in a particular set of values. Elected officials should be free to make decisions while in office, without having continually to consult the public. Democracy is seen as unworkable if every issue is put up for public referendum. While in office, decision-makers should be free to make temporarily unpopular decisions for the ultimate good of all. If these decisions prove foolish or unbeneficial, the recourse of the public is to vote the officials out of office (or, in the case of appointed boards, to vote out those who did the appointing). Opening the decision to community debate is seen as relinquishing the responsibility to govern. According to Inger and Stout,

Democracy does not mean that all the people make all the decisions. The fundamental requirements of democracy are met if the people have ample opportunity to influence or unseat the decision makers, if those who govern can be held accountable by the people. Actual day-by-day decisions are left to representatives of the people, who expect those representatives to "get on with it" without referring all the decisions to them. In fact, democracy is served when the representative accepts responsibility for the decisions.¹⁴

In sum, successful school desegregation does not require the active consent of the public. Quite the opposite, public consent is only likely to follow a firm move to desegregate. While a decision to desegregate may emerge despite opening it up to the public, this is a more difficult route, since it opens the door to community conflict. In comparing eight communities that successfully arrived at a desegregation plan with five that did not, Inger and Stout conclude: "One lesson of these eight cities is clear. The less the public is asked for its opinion during the period of policy-formation, the greater the likelihood that the public will accept the integration plan."¹⁵

A prior question can be raised at this point: What kinds of school boards are likely to engage in the type of preemptive decision-making recommended by these writers, and what types are likely to fail to take such action (either by opening the decision to the community or by deciding unfavorably)? According to Robert Crain the most critical community variable is the presence or absence of a strong civic elite,¹⁶ even though such elites tend not to intervene directly in the decision-making process, the board itself taking the major action. The character of the board itself is the most immediate variable affecting the nature of the decision taken on school desegregation,¹⁷ but it appears to be determined by the presence or absence of a strong elite.

Briefly, the qualities of boards that take strong action in favor of desegregation include a high degree of cohesiveness or unity among board members and, more important, members who are personally "liberals" on civil rights issues.¹⁸ Board members who are liberals tend not to be political professionals but rather high-status laymen. They also tend not to be constituency-oriented,¹⁹ i.e., are less inclined to open the issue to the public. Cohesive boards are more likely to come to a firm decision for obvious reasons and thus to avoid rancorous conflict in the community. As Crain says,

Whereas the cohesive board may be able to put up a "united front," each dissenting board member will air his public position. This means that the most conservative board member will become a symbolic leader for the segregationists, whose position will gain legitimacy from the support of a public official. Thus the segregationists not only have more opportunity to organize, they also have a more legitimate position to organize around.²⁰

The character of the board is primarily a product of the recruitment process. Appointed boards are more likely than elected ones to arrive at a firm decision.²¹ Even more important are informal aspects of recruitment. Crain finds that cities with liberal

and cohesive boards tend to have well-organized civic elites that have not escaped to the suburbs. Such elites, when active in the recruitment process, tend to push for "reform-oriented" boards with all the characteristics likely to lead to a favorable desegregation decision.²²

Suburban communities are especially likely to have weak civic elites, particularly if the major economic interests are absentee owned. This is a feature of Daly City, a suburb of San Francisco, described by Stout and Sroufe.²³ Not only was the school board of Daly City unable to come to a firm decision regarding school desegregation on its own but opening the decision to the public proved particularly inappropriate. The Daly City board hoped to build support by opening up the decision to the community, but the action had the opposite result. Stout and Sroufe attribute this to the absence of a civic elite with any real influence. Again, the authors recommend that the board should have taken action on its own without consulting the public.

Emphasizing the importance of the decision to desegregate, and therefore the politics of school desegregation, leads to a prescription of strong board action, perhaps against the will of the majority of community residents. The call is for preemptive action on the part of school boards. Possible negative consequences, such as white backlash, increased conflict, removal of children from the public schools, or the moving out of the community of entire families, are generally considered unlikely. Thus, the Commission on Civil Rights reports,

In the cases studied by the Commission, desegregation of the schools generally has been regarded by the communities involved as successful. Educators in these communities have expressed the view that the desegregation plans on the whole have been implemented successfully, although the Commission's study reveals that much remains to be done before racial isolation in the schools is completely eliminated. In most cases—even where there was initial opposition—desegregation has won acceptance from parents and civic groups. In those cases where information is available, the Commission found no evidence that white parents have withdrawn their children from the public schools in any significant numbers. In most cases, opposition has subsided and there is general community support for desegregation.²⁴

It should be noted that the Commission based its conclusions in this section on an unpublished report by Stout and Inger.

In sum, provided certain types of support, such as those suggested by the Commission on Civil Rights,²⁵ accompany it, the decision to desegregate the schools is expected to lead to lasting desegregation.

INGLEWOOD'S SITUATION: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

The basic empirical findings here in regard to the desegregation decision parallel the findings of these other studies. A school board that was not liberal opened the decision-making process to the community. Severe conflict ensued, and two desegregation plans were defeated. Since the beginning of the study, however, there are clearly certain ways in which the Inglewood experience does not jibe with those reported in these other studies. As a consequence, the structure and focus of the analysis here diverges in several important respects from those of previous studies, and the normative conclusions are ultimately in clear opposition to those of Crain, Inger, and Stout.

Most important, it was found that Inglewood, although a small suburban city, was subject to some of the same long-run forces that undermine successful school desegregation in large cities. Most large cities, including those that implement school desegregation, often experience continual neighborhood transition from white segregation, to temporary integration, to eventual resegregation.²⁶

The reasons for this process are complex. Among them have been the continuing migration of southern black families to northern urban centers, an overrepresentation of young families with school-age children in this migration, the movement of white families to the suburbs, and the withdrawal of white children from the public to private schools.²⁷ On this last point the Commission reports that in 1965 about 40 percent of white children in Boston and St. Louis attended private schools; in Philadelphia the figure was more than 60 percent.²⁸ As a result some central city school systems have become almost entirely nonwhite in composition, and racial segregation between school districts rather than within each district is becoming an ever-increasing problem. While proposals have been put forward to reorganize schools on a metropolitan basis, discarding old school districts,²⁹ instances of even minimal exchange between suburban and city school districts are extremely few,³⁰ and the chances of total metropolitan reorganization in the foreseeable future are remote. A result has been a growing sense of hopelessness among black leaders regarding the goal of integration and a turning to the goal of black community control over predominantly black schools.

Some of the forces that have led to the resegregation of urban schools seem to be uncontrollable: the black migration northward, the age distribution of black children, the desire of parents to have their children attend parochial school, and the genuine desire for suburban living. One way in which policy-makers might be able to influence these processes is to deter that part of the white exodus (either by retreat to the suburbs or private schools) that is a reaction to black in-migration. If whites can be induced to remain or do not feel compelled to escape, then it may be possible to avoid the resegregation process.

Inglewood is directly subject to these population pressures. It is situated adjacent to a large and expanding Los Angeles black ghetto. A few years ago Inglewood was an all-white suburb. Since then there has been a gradual in-migration of black families into the eastern sector of town, as part of a "natural" expansion of the ghetto. It is this development that has created de facto segregation in the schools.

The demographic forces operating on this small suburban community are, perhaps, overwhelming. As will be shown in later chapters, many of the residents of Inglewood believe that it will become all black. They disagree only in their assessments of the rate of resegregation and in their opinions as to the factors that will impede or accelerate the process. In time the community probably will become predominantly black. In these circumstances the decision to desegregate becomes a less-central issue. Certainly, the assumption that desegregated schools will lead to an integrated society, at least within the existing community framework, does not apply. The central normative question does not concern what will make the school board come to a decision to desegregate the schools. Rather, it is how, if at all, the school board might contribute to population stabilization under the conditions that pertain in Inglewood.

Other communities seem to face similar problems. Examples include Hempstead, New York, one of the first suburbs on Long Island as one travels east from New York City.³¹ At the time it was investigated this community was 22 percent black, but the elementary schools were already estimated to be 70 percent black. Daly City also has experienced black in-migration. From 1960 to 1967 its population composition changed from less than 2 percent nonwhite to almost 20 percent.³² These communities raise a critical question for the future of this country: Can black families, seeking better homes and better schools in the surrounding suburbs of overcrowded, segregated cities, be absorbed into these areas, or will they resegregate also? Will the next ten years see a growth of all-black suburbs ringing the major cities, surrounded by an ever-retreating circle of all-white suburbs?

Framework for Analysis

Lasting desegregation, it seems, depends on forces operating on at least three levels: demography, the schools, and politics. These form a type of hierarchy. If demographic forces are very strong, the room for maneuvering at the next two levels is considerably reduced. On the other hand, if the first two levels are not operating powerfully, politicians have more freedom in which to operate.

The Demography of Desegregation

The factor that is most critical for the prospects of lasting desegregation is the potential size of the black population. In some cities there is a ceiling on the proportion of the city that can reasonably be expected to become black. This ceiling is determined by such factors as the source of black migration, if any, to the city, the size of the black population in that source, and the proportion likely to move. Such factors cannot of course be calculated precisely and generally depend on projections from the past. If a city has been a major center for southern black migrants in the past, it seems reasonable to expect it will continue to be so. A suburb near an expanding ghetto can expect an even more rapid increase in black population, and if the ghetto is a large one the ceiling may be higher than the size of the total community. On the other hand, a city with an old, established black population and little in-migration has a completely different ceiling.

Needless to say, white response in terms of moving out is an important determinant of the possible proportion of a community that can be black. But it is probable that this white response is in turn affected by the expected size of an in-migration. One could hypothesize that there will be very little pressure on the whites to move, if the ceiling is low; turnover will be unaffected by expectations. But long before the potential ceiling reaches 100 percent the pressure to move increases tremendously, leading to a fulfillment of the expectation.

Many of the case studies of school desegregation describe communities that have a fairly low expecting ceiling. For example, Evanston, Illinois, has a fairly substantial black population—11.5 percent in the community and 20 percent in the schools³³—but most of these are long-time residents. "Community X," described by Donald Bouma and James Hoffman, experienced a rapid growth in black population, but in 1967 this had only reached 9 percent of the total and was showing signs of leveling off.³⁴ As a fairly isolated small city, not adjacent to a large urban center, it is not an area of major black relocation. Teaneck, New Jersey, which was an all-white suburb in 1954 and was

faced with a black in-migration from a neighboring ghetto much like Inglewood, nevertheless was in a fundamentally different position because the nearby ghetto, in Inglewood, New Jersey, was relatively small.³⁵ Had it been New York City, Teaneck might tell quite a different story.

The Schools and Lasting Desegregation

The schools play a central role in the process of demographic change. Not only do residential patterns dictate school attendance patterns but the opposite is also true. Their children's welfare is very important to most parents. People are unwilling to tolerate the negative consequences of social change when their children are affected. Parents who feel that their children are being hurt by changes in the school system may move out of a community, even in the face of economic loss, a break with old friends and great inconvenience.

Thus, the schools often lead the way in resegregation. A typical sequence in northern cities has been a dramatic increase in the ratio of black to white children in a school, long before the surrounding population shows the same ratio. The school system is not one of the easier institutions in which to break into the "vicious circle." In cities with the demographic pressures faced by Inglewood, it is probably one of the more difficult. Even minimal disturbance or disruption is likely to frighten white parents into withdrawing their children from desegregated schools. Once the schools become predominantly black, it is only a matter of time before the surrounding area is resegregated. Only if the schools can avoid a rapid shift-over in population composition is there hope of avoiding rapid residential resegregation.

The Politics of Desegregation Revisited

Within this framework, the politics of desegregation in Inglewood, and in communities where similar conditions exist, is viewed as less important than the demographics of community stabilization. Decision or nondecision by the school board may have more effect upon the rate of demographic processes than upon their ultimate outcome. Moreover, the process of decision-making may be as important as its substance. The facile judgment that preemptive decision-making serves a social good should be reevaluated. Unlike other studies, this one looks carefully at the content of political opposition to desegregation. The opponents of desegregation are people with real interests whose personal decisions to remain in a community or leave can ultimately support or destroy any action by the school board. Preemptive action by the school board may produce desegregated schools but may also speed up the very process it is designed to avoid.

This book follows the three topics of demography, schools, and politics. Chapter 2 deals with the demographic pressures on Inglewood. It describes the kind of community into which black families are moving and the reactions to this in-migration. The prospects for the community in terms of its chances for becoming an all-black suburb are considered.

Chapter 3 examines the role of the schools in the process of population turnover. The growth of de facto segregation in the east-side schools is detailed, showing how this is outpacing residential resegregation. In order to understand the forces that might lead people to move out of the community, some of the sources of conflict and disruption in the east-side "integrated" schools, at least as seen by community members, are examined.

Chapter 4 describes the parties to the school desegregation conflict within the community, attempting to show how their positions on desegregation relate to the broader problems facing the community. Chapter 5 describes and analyzes the conflict as it developed between 1965 and 1969, showing the roles played by the various interest groups and the school board and administration.

The final chapter considers the alternatives open to the board. What, if anything, could they have done to prevent resegregation? Would a preemptive decision to desegregate the schools have worked? Are there other options that might have shown better long-term prospects?

The Postscript looks at the developments in Inglewood subsequent to the period of study to see the consequence of the board's earlier actions. In particular, it is of interest to examine the degree to which the process of resegregation has progressed.

METHODS

The approach to the gathering of information about Inglewood was closely akin to anthropological field work, consisting primarily of interviewing key informants, attending meetings, and collecting as much related printed matter as possible. The period of intensive field work extended from January to July 1969.

About thirty individuals were interviewed, some briefly over the telephone, others repeatedly in person for a number of hours. Those interviewed included the superintendent of schools, three of the five incumbent school board members, three persons who were running for school board in the up-coming election (April 1969), seven leaders of community organizations that had an interest in the schools, the president of the PTA council, a reporter for a local newspaper, a minister, two teachers, a student body president, two city administrators, the Human Relations Coordinator for the school district, and

a consultant for the Bureau of Intergroup Relations (BIR) of the state department of education, which had been invited by the local school board to study and make recommendations to Inglewood on the school desegregation issue. Interviews were usually held in an informal manner, after which copious "field notes" would be tape recorded, trying to record all that had been said. Quotations in the text are thus approximations of what people said, since there usually was not a tape recording of the interview.

During the period of field work almost all of the meetings of the school board and of the Citizens' Advisory committee were attended. The latter group was formed, met, and was dissolved within the period of study so that there is fairly comprehensive information about it. Documents examined included census materials, minutes of meetings, newspapers, official reports of all types emanating from the school system, reports of various advisory groups, voting records, and so on.

The study was not approached with a completely open mind, free to experience Inglewood in whatever way it chose to. Certain things were looked for. First, it was assumed that the conflict over the schools was about something, and therefore it was attempted to identify the "real" issues and interests that were involved. (Problems in this assumption are discussed in Chapter 4.) Second, it was assumed that these interests would be represented by various organizations, though not all individuals who shared interests would necessarily be organized. And third, it was assumed that interest groups would have various strategies for furthering their interests. It was also expected that the school board would have methods and strategies of its own for dealing with pressure and conflict. Other than this rather simple model of community political process, there was no anticipation as to what the particular interests would be, how they would be aligned, the degree to which they would be organized, or the strategies that would be used by either board or interest groups. Finally, it was felt that it was essential to get as complete a view of the social structure of the community as possible, in order to understand interests and strategies fully.

The city of Inglewood is one of the many independent cities in the Los Angeles basin. It is located eight miles southwest of downtown Los Angeles and is contiguous to the city of Los Angeles on its eastern and northeastern borders. To the southwest and south lie two similar communities, Lennox and Hawthorne. To the west is an area known as Westchester, although it is technically part of Los Angeles city; and on the northwestern side is an unincorporated area of Los Angeles County known as Ladera Heights, which is part of the Inglewood Unified School District.

While it is a politically discrete unit, to a casual observer driving through Inglewood would not appear to be a distinguishable community. It is simply one of the many areas of suburban-type dwellings that make up the huge Los Angeles metropolitan area. Despite the peculiarities of defining suburbs in Los Angeles (as any independent city in the county), however, Inglewood is comparable to suburbs that lie adjacent to other large cities on at least two dimensions: economic dependence upon the large city and self-governance.

During the 1960s, Inglewood experienced a migration of black families into the northeastern section of the city. The blacks moved into a previously white community. One result of this in-migration has been de facto segregation in the schools. In order to understand the events in Inglewood it is necessary to examine the kind of community black families have been moving into, as well as the nature and impact of the migration.

A DECLINING ECONOMY

Before the depression Inglewood served as the retail and business center for southwestern Los Angeles County. At that time it was

believed that Los Angeles would expand southward toward the harbor at Long Beach, and many people invested in land in this section of the county. Between 1920 and 1930 the population of Inglewood rose by almost 500 percent. After World War II, however, the city suffered an economic decline. One reason is that Los Angeles did not expand in the expected direction but instead spread westward. Property values fell, and gradually the area between the nearby Los Angeles International Airport and the harbor at Long Beach filled with industry.¹

Another factor contributing to Inglewood's decline has been the growth of regional commercial centers that are independent of political boundaries. In 1957 and 1959 two such centers opened to the south of Inglewood, capturing a large segment of the market area it had previously dominated in that direction. By 1962 two other major shopping centers had encroached on its northern and western market area. In contrast to these more modern facilities the Inglewood downtown section (located around La Brea Avenue, south of Manchester Boulevard on Map 1) is characterized by older buildings and parking problems.² Several major retailers moved out in the 1950s and 1960s, and the trend has been toward low-budget, low-overhead retail operations.³ In 1963 about half of Inglewood's residents did their shopping for such major goods as furniture, clothing, and appliances outside of the city.⁴


Three of the largest economic enterprises in the city are the Hollywood Park Race Track (featuring thoroughbred and harness racing), the Inglewood Forum (home of the Los Angeles Lakers and Kings), and the Inglewood Cemetery. As can be seen in Map 1, these three occupy a strip of land east of Prairie Avenue that divides the city in two.

Apart from these and a few furniture plants, oil wells, and other factories, Inglewood is industrially a small extension of the Los Angeles International Airport complex. Firms in Inglewood engage in subcontracting for aircraft and aerospace prime contractors.⁵ They manufacture scientific instruments and machinery and engage in basic and applied research. The Northrop Institute of Technology, a four-year technical college specializing in engineering and aeronautics, is located in Inglewood. In a promotional pamphlet put out by the Chamber of Commerce the city is described as the "Harbor of the Air" and the "Aerospace Center of the West."⁶

Nearness to the airport is not an unmixed blessing. The noise of aircraft landing is overpowering in some areas of town. This is such a problem that, despite many other urgent issues facing the community, it is viewed by residents as the most critical. In a special census conducted by the California State Department of Finance in 1969, 48.7 percent of those households that responded felt that aircraft noise was the most critical issue facing the community. This percentage is in part a function of the structure of the item, since respondents were only permitted to select one of eight predetermined issues, some of

MAP 1

Major Streets and Neighborhoods
of the Inglewood Unified School District



MAP 1
MAJOR STREETS & NEIGHBORHOODS
OF THE INGLEWOOD
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

which might reasonably have been combined. Still, the second-highest percentage among the issues was only 16.4.

Inglewood's industries tend to be concentrated in two sections of town: one parallel to and north of Florence Avenue and the other in the section west of the San Diego Freeway. A large proportion of Inglewood's work force does not work in the city itself, commuting instead to many areas of the Los Angeles basin.⁷

During the period of its greatest prosperity, from 1920 to World War II, Inglewood could be described as a suburban middle-class community.⁸ The Chamber of Commerce and the city's officials would like to believe this state persists. For example, the General Plan states: "Inglewood's classification as a middle and upper middle income suburban community of the forties has carried over into the present decade."⁹ All indications, however, point to the fact that, with the general decline in economic prominence, the city has become more lower-middle and upper working class in character. The 1960 census reveals that 10 percent of the employed residents were unskilled laborers, about 48 percent were semiskilled, and 15 percent were skilled. Thus, almost three-quarters of the working population were blue collar before the black in-migration. This is reflected in the educational distribution of the city, with only 9 percent having completed college in 1960 and 23 percent without any high school education. The median number of school years completed was 12.2, comparable to the general educational level of Los Angeles County, where the median school years completed was 12.1.

THE CHARACTER AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF NEIGHBORHOODS

The population of the Inglewood Unified School District is not homogeneous. As can be seen in Map 1, the city is divided along a north-south axis by the cemetery, Forum, and race track. This "buffer zone" marks a distinction in ethnic composition: almost all the blacks in Inglewood live to the east of this zone.

Table 1 shows the distribution of blacks by neighborhood for 1970.¹⁰ The areas of heaviest black concentration are in the north-eastern sections of the city known as Morningside Park and Morningside Heights. These black families are new residents in the city, an influx from adjacent territories having started in the middle 1960s. This movement is part of a general westerly expansion of black residence in the Los Angeles basin. In 1950 there were virtually no blacks in Inglewood, and none of the census tracts adjacent to Inglewood was more than 1 percent nonwhite. By 1960 this had changed so that four out of seven of the census tracts adjacent to Inglewood on the

TABLE 1

Total Population and Percent Black,
Neighborhoods of Inglewood Unified
School District, 1970

Neighborhood	Total	Percent Black
West Side		
Ladera Heights*	9,438	1.1
South Ladera and Industrial Area near Centinela	10,099	.3
North Inglewood	11,076	1.9
Industrial Area near San Diego Freeway	6,077	1.1
Central Inglewood	21,052	.3
East Side		
Morningside Park	14,078	41.3
Morningside Heights	8,900	40.7
Lockhaven	13,125	1.4
Imperial Village	3,166	5.4
Total	97,011	10.6

*These figures are a rough approximation. See the Appendix for how the figure was determined.

Source: Derived from 1970 census.

north and east were between 5 and 20 percent nonwhite. Meanwhile, in areas one tract removed from Inglewood's northeast borders, sections that in 1950 were less than 1 percent nonwhite were over 20 percent so by 1960. The gradual in-migration of blacks came as no surprise to the city of Inglewood.

The neighborhoods moved into by black families constitute some of the better residential sections of the city (see Table 2). Ladera Heights is clearly the wealthiest section of the school district, with 80 percent of its homes falling in the \$50,000 or more price range. But Morningside Park's older homes are set farther back from the street and display a quiet elegance that the Ladera houses lack. Indeed, Morningside has a history of aloofness from the rest of the city that undoubtedly played a role in the city's later lack of concern for Morningside's problems.

Apart from Ladera, the west side of town, with its greater commercial and industrial concentration, shows a lower socioeconomic

TABLE 2

Indicators of Socioeconomic Status of Neighborhoods
of Inglewood Unified School District,
1960, 1969, and 1970*

Neighborhood	Approximate Median Value of Owner-Occupied Units		Approximate Median Income	
	1960	1970	1960	1969
West Side				
Ladera Heights		\$50,000+		
South Ladera and Industrial Area	\$15-20,000	25-35,000	\$8,500	\$9,600
North Inglewood Industrial Area	10-15,000	15-25,000	6,500	7,700
near Freeway	10-15,000	20-25,000	6,500	7,400
Central Inglewood	10-20,000	20-25,000	6,800	8,000
East Side				
Morningside Park	20-25,000	25-35,000	9,000	9,600
Morningside Heights	25,000+	25-35,000	9,500	9,400
Lockhaven	10-15,000	20-25,000	6,500	7,900
Imperial Village	20-25,000	25-35,000	9,500	9,900

*See Appendix for derivation of data.

status than the east. Houses throughout the western half tend to be older and built of wood rather than stucco. In recent years there has been considerable change in land use from single family units to apartment buildings. As the U.S.C. Planning Study puts it:

A careless and rapid interjection of low budget, speculative, medium density multiple dwellings are being built largely by people with little or no concern for Inglewood. This type of dwelling caters to a transient population and upsets the stability of the community.¹¹

On the west side, about 30 to 50 percent of housing was multiple unit in 1960, and by 1970 the proportion of renter-occupied housing was around 60 to 70 percent. Much of this is probably accounted for by new apartments. On the east side, with the exception of Morningside Heights (an area of substantial apartment development but fairly high rents and socioeconomic character—see Table 2), there were fewer

apartments in 1960. About 80 percent of the housing was in single-unit structures. Morningside Park, the area of heaviest black concentration, is a neighborhood of low tenant occupancy. In 1970 only 26 percent of the units were rental.¹²

The east side does have its deteriorated section, namely Lockhaven. The lots here are very long and narrow with small, old one-story wood houses built on them. Cars that no longer run sit in many yards. Many of these lots are ready for redevelopment, therefore no one is willing to tear down the existing low-level housing. It mainly is rented out to transients. Lockhaven is a "poor white" neighborhood with the reputation of high crime and prostitution.

Another area deserving special mention is Imperial Village, also on the east side. As can be seen in Table 2, this is a section of fairly high socioeconomic status by Inglewood standards. Before World War II Imperial Village was a semirural slum known as "little Alabama." After the war, it became a housing development using GI and FHA financing. It is still not a section of extensive apartment development, and the 1970 census shows only 26 percent of the units tenant occupied.¹³

Many city employees, mainly firemen and policemen, live in Imperial Village, in part because of the type of housing found there. In addition it is a requirement of the original city charter that city employees live within the city boundaries. The city employees generally do not like this provision and have tried to get a charter amendment passed that would permit them to live outside. Proposition 2-K, asking for such an amendment, was put on the ballot in 1969, having failed the previous election, but again it did not pass. As Map 2 shows, Imperial Village is like a finger jutting out of the city, and one person interviewed suggested that the selection of this residential area indicated the desire of city employees to live as far away from the city as was legally possible.

In sum, the neighborhoods of Inglewood show some diversity, varying from working-class areas characterized by low-cost apartments, such as Central Inglewood, to solidly middle-class sections of home ownership, such as Morningside Park and from wealthy Ladera Heights to deteriorated Lockhaven. Later analysis will indicate the ways in which neighborhood patterns are related to positions on the desegregation issue.

BLACK IN-MIGRATION AND WHITE REACTION

Expansion of Negro residential areas in recent years has been led by Negroes of high socioeconomic status—not only higher than the rest of the Negro population, but

often higher than the white resident of the "invaded" neighborhood. The invaded areas tend to be occupied by whites of moderately high socioeconomic status, and the housing is predominantly in good rather than substandard condition.¹⁴

This analysis fits Inglewood's experience. The black families moving into Morningside are overwhelmingly middle class; perhaps they are a little less well off than the white residents of their neighborhoods in that many of the wives in black families have to work, but they are better off than most of Inglewood's whites.

On the whole, the blacks who have moved into Inglewood have done so in order to provide better opportunities for their families, to find middle-class housing and a good school system for their children, and especially to live in an integrated neighborhood. As one black leader put it, "We want to make this an integrated community, somewhat contrary to the separatist talk that is going around." A member of the school board put it succinctly: "The black population are integrationists—they are not separatists. If they were separatists, they would not have chosen to move to Inglewood."

The movement of black families into Morningside has followed the classic process of "invasion," i.e., an increase in the percentage of blacks in the population has been accompanied by a decline in the number of whites.¹⁵ Blacks have taken over white housing rather than occupying previously unused land. While some of the white exodus undoubtedly has occurred for other reasons (including aircraft noise and the air pollution of the Los Angeles basin, as well as the more general reasons for people moving), some of it has been a response to the black in-migration. Why is this so?

Of central importance is the fact that almost none of the white families in Inglewood want to live in an all-black or predominantly black neighborhood. Their reasons may include some irrational feelings about race, but there are ample rational reasons for not wishing to live in an all-black neighborhood, reasons that are shared by many black families in Inglewood. Most important seem to be fear that property values will decline drastically if a neighborhood becomes all-black (and people are unwilling to risk such a major investment) and fear that the quality of the schools will suffer (and people are unwilling to "sacrifice" their children). Of course property values do not have to decline if blacks move into a white neighborhood, but this depends on the maintenance of services (including schools) that are attractive to residents of any color. Once it is evident that a neighborhood will indeed become almost all black, the chances of maintaining services decline, in part because all-black neighborhoods tend to be poorer, hence provide less of a tax base to support quality

services. These fears appear to exist irrespective of political orientation. One white resident of Morningside Park who is politically liberal and expressed a strong preference for living in an integrated neighborhood nevertheless said to us: "Everyone has his own breaking point. Mine is the election [for school board and city council in 1969]. If candidates who will do something to stop the resegregation of Morningside Park aren't elected, we will move."

The process of white exodus from Morningside has been exacerbated by the activities of real estate agents. The story is not an unfamiliar one.¹⁶ After the first few black families moved in some agents marked off the area as "inevitably going black," only showing houses for sale to prospective black buyers. According to a member of the Inglewood Stabilization Committee, a body to be discussed shortly, some of the real estate agents in Inglewood engaged in unscrupulous behavior. They would use scare techniques, such as telephoning white home owners east of Prairie Avenue and asking them if they knew that their neighbors were selling. They put up extra large "For Sale" signs to emphasize what was happening and encourage panic selling.

It should be noted that Morningside Park was ready, because of its age, for a major population turnover in the early 1960s. Airplane noise increased the pressure to move. The perimeter of the expanding black ghetto happened to reach the area just as it was ripe for turnover anyway. While whites were selling for many reasons, almost all prospective buyers were black.

The problem of avoiding the changeover of a white neighborhood to a black one is extremely difficult. One approach frequently found is for neighborhoods to try to keep a firm line against the first black families moving in. There is evidence of this occurring in Imperial Village, where one black family was harassed by white neighborhood children. Eventually some police protection was provided for them at the request of white neighbors, but the experience was so unpleasant they moved out. Another tack is to attempt to stabilize a neighborhood so that a certain proportion of the population is black without this proportion changing drastically over time.

EFFORTS TO STABILIZE MORNINGSIDE

One effort to stabilize Morningside came from the residents of that area. They formed an organization originally called Morningside Park Neighbors, now Inglewood Neighbors, aimed at keeping Morningside Park a stable integrated neighborhood. They approached the problem from a number of angles. One was a program called "Project Fifty Families," which tried to encourage white families to move into the northern section of Morningside Park, with a goal of fifty families

by September 1967. Their goals, methods, and hopes can perhaps best be expressed by the organization itself; the following are some quotes from one of their fact sheets:

Why this project?

We believe we can keep Morningside Park the fine, integrated community that it is if Caucasian families will move here in sufficient numbers to maintain a balance in the schools. By publicizing Morningside Park among Fair Housing groups and others sympathetic to integration, we expect to reach many persons who would prefer to live here.

How does it operate?

Our Outreach committee has begun contacts with organizations and companies whose members and employees would be prospective residents. For example, we have met with teacher associations and aerospace personnel departments. They will distribute our literature and make referrals to us.

The Housing committee is compiling an inventory of housing for sale and for rent and will assist families in finding housing. This service refers families to local brokers and landlords, but does not take part in the transactions. We have just helped place a college professor and his family in a home rental.

Will it work?

We believe the chances for success are greater here than in most communities because:

1. The area is very desirable—fine houses, good community spirit.
2. The schools have a reputation for excellence.
3. Small numbers of new families can have a great impact—only 100 children in Freeman School will maintain the balance.
4. The City has expressed official support of efforts to maintain integration by appointing the Community Stabilization Advisory Committee. No other city in the County has done this.

Yes, we've got a lot going for us.¹⁷

Unfortunately, it was not enough. The project failed to receive the support of the city because of its "racial" connotation and never got

off the ground. (The centrality of the schools in this statement should not go unnoticed.)

Inglewood Neighbors also has tried to devote some effort to convincing white families that they should not move out. This type of discussion occurs at an informal level. One of the leaders of the group, however, said she felt it was hopeless to try to talk someone out of leaving.

They go through a "funny period" while they are making their decision, and argue with you, thinking up excuses why they should leave. No matter what you say to convince them to stay they invent a reason why they should leave. Some parents say they'll stay until their kids are hurt in some way. But the children reflect their parents' prejudices, and sure enough they begin to complain that they are having trouble from black kids.

There is little an organization can do to prevent a person from moving out. Even if his neighbors are able to ostracize him socially for the remainder of his stay in the neighborhood, this hardly compares with the dangers of losing money on his house. Besides, it need be endured only temporarily. The woman just quoted has since moved to Pacific Palisades, while the founder of Inglewood Neighbors, a white liberal, has moved to Beverly Hills (both all-white areas).

In mid-1966, in part in response to the agitations of Inglewood Neighbors, a Community Stabilization Committee was set up by the city. Its purpose was to help solve the problems of a community that is becoming integrated. The Stabilization Committee has the same status as the various boards and commissions appointed to act in an advisory capacity to the city council. The members are appointed by the mayor, with appropriate representation from each councilmanic district.

Some efforts have been made by this committee to deal with the problems of the east side, specifically by trying to curb the activities of the realtors. They took evidence of malpractices to the State Real Estate Commission and to various better business groups. An investigation was conducted and a ruling handed down limiting the size of "For Sale" signs. The intention was to calm down the panic selling spree. Many realtors complained that they would lose money. The city Planning Commission policed the area to ensure compliance. The official organization of real estate dealers, the Inglewood Board of Realtors, has been outwardly cooperative with the Stabilization Committee; but its control over the actions of individual members appears limited.

During the period of study the process of resegregation in

Morningside had slowed somewhat. While the efforts of the Stabilization Committee and Inglewood Neighbors probably played a part, the most critical factor was the general lull in the economy. At the time of the study money was very tight and the housing market throughout the Los Angeles basin had slowed considerably.

PROSPECTS

Up until 1970 the cemetery, Forum, and race track provided a "buffer zone" against black expansion in the city. But a sense of gloom was found to pervade almost all residents of Inglewood about the future of their city. Nearly everyone believes that Inglewood will become "another Compton," a nearby city that recently changed from an all-white to an all-black community in the space of a few years. Almost everyone feels that inevitably the whole of Inglewood will become black. A conservative member of the school board put it this way: "Inglewood will inevitably become Negro. The question is, how fast."

Essentially two processes are anticipated. One is that, if Morningside becomes resegregated, the middle-class black families will leave and be replaced by poorer blacks. The area thus will be converted into a ghetto. As a member of the Stabilization Committee said, "If they don't do something to integrate this year, the east side will become totally black. Even those black families that are community minded and involved in civic affairs don't want to live in a ghetto and will leave if that's what happens." Indeed, many of Inglewood's black residents are from Compton, having moved to Inglewood to escape the resegregation there.

A black man, active in school affairs, explained why blacks would move out.

They come here almost exclusively with the idea of being part of an integrated community. And if they move out they obviously won't sell to white people. When have you heard of a case of an area that was occupied by blacks being sold to whites? The only people they will be able to sell to will be those who can't afford the housing in Morningside Park, so they will take out first and second mortgages to buy. Then they won't be able to afford the payments and the houses will become multiple dwellings and rapidly deteriorate.

A woman running for the school board gave her analysis: "Part of the problem of Morningside Park is that Negroes will move out if

some action isn't taken, and they will sell to a poorer class of Negro. Then it will become a ghetto. Once this happens, Central Inglewood, which is fairly conservative, will be sliced through like a knife. People will move out fast."

This brings the second anticipated process. It is believed that those areas that have not yet been settled by blacks, especially the poorer areas of North Inglewood, Central Inglewood, and Lockhaven, will become black ghettos very easily. Morningside Park has not become black more quickly in part because the houses are expensive and not too many black families can afford them. But if the "barrier" were to fall in the cheaper neighborhoods, the population pressure from the ghetto to the northeast, with its chronic housing shortage, would lead to a rapid influx. One citizen, himself black, expressed his fear like this:

The area I am most frightened about is the area near Centinela Park [North Inglewood]. This is a poor area, with a lot of apartments. The houses sell for around \$15,000, so if it went black, it would be lower class black, and it would probably go black much more rapidly than Morningside Park.

A white citizen summarized the situation: "If the Central Inglewood area was to change its racial composition, that would really mean the end of Inglewood as it stands now. It would become another Compton."

There are some forces working against these processes. One of these is a belief shared by many residents that Inglewood has a sense of community: people feel an emotional tie to the city and would not leave it lightly. One school board member mentioned this. "A lot of the old guard do have ties. They feel they're part of the old aristocracy of Inglewood and that they'll live out their time here. Then it's no longer their concern." Personally, he felt differently. "I have no special tie to Inglewood. I'll leave if it's necessary, when the time comes."

A woman who is very active in the PTA expressed some optimism. While she believed that "there will be those who move out no matter what," she also felt that the city would not become another Compton. "A lot of people wouldn't let it become a Compton. There is so much industry, and it is a nice urban setting. There are a lot of high class people here. They won't give Inglewood up." But not everyone agrees with this assessment. One of the people from the Bureau of Intergroup Relations of the state Department of Education, which conducted a study of the city's schools, for example, held a different opinion: "As is typical in the Los Angeles basin, there is no identification with the community. If things get bad, they simply will move out. There is no commitment to solving the problems of Inglewood."

For some white families, however, moving would be difficult. A member of the Stabilization Committee estimated this to be the case for as many as 60 percent of the white families. Old people who own their homes and who do not have the income to support a move and families with children in college and husbands past their earning peak would find it especially hard to move.

In addition, two of the neighborhoods are not as immediately threatened with a black influx. One of these is Ladera Heights, which, because of high property values, is likely to change more slowly. The Ladera area, however, not being part of the city, might be able to secede from the school district. Indeed, some efforts already have been made to do so, but so far have failed. The other neighborhood is Imperial Village. One resident of this neighborhood described the situation in this way:

People get scared and run away from the schools, but this is not as great a problem in Imperial Village as in Morningside Park. The reason is that Imperial Village is the area in which many of the Inglewood city employees live. These employees, by law, must live in Inglewood so that if they want to maintain their employment with the city, they are not likely to leave Imperial Village. Where else could they go within Inglewood? Morningside Park is somewhat more expensive, and other areas of Inglewood are less nice than the Imperial Village tract.

This is probably a short-term protection against black in-migration since, if the rest of the city becomes black, it is unlikely that the white city employees of Imperial Village will want to hold on to their jobs.

In sum, Inglewood is a city faced with a major dilemma and challenge. Almost everyone believes that the city will ultimately become another Compton, yet no one wants this to happen. The conflict in Inglewood is thus not over an ultimate goal but rather over the means to attain this goal, namely the avoidance of an all-black Inglewood. While there are shades of difference in opinion, the overwhelming division follows geographical and residential lines. The east side is in favor of desegregation. They argue that if Inglewood is not integrated soon, the whole east side will become black, and then it will be too late. Residents on the west side feel that desegregating either the city or the schools will merely hasten the process. They would rather try to maintain the line at Prairie Avenue for as long as possible.

The schools play a central role in the process of population change. The nature of this role and why it is critical will be examined in the next chapter.

The proponents of school integration view it as a tool for eventually achieving social integration. However, in Inglewood, in the short run, it has produced the opposite effect. The schools are resegregating faster than the neighborhoods within which they are located. There are a number of reasons for this, some unavoidable, others perhaps partially amenable to control by school policymakers.

DE FACTO SEGREGATION

The data in Table 3 indicate changes in racial distribution in the schools during a three-year period. When compared with the location in the schools as shown in Map 2 it is clear that ethnic patterns in the schools follow ethnic distributions in neighborhoods. The table does not indicate other minorities in the schools: 8 percent Spanish surname, 2 percent Oriental, and less than 1 percent American Indian. These groups differ from blacks in that they generally were well established in Inglewood and were spread more evenly throughout the city. There was no dramatic increase in their proportion of the population during the 1960s.

Looking more closely at the table, one sees that no school on the west side had more than 2 percent blacks in its student body in 1969. On the east side, however, the elementary schools serving Morningside Park and Morningside Heights (Freeman, Warren Lane, and Woodworth) rapidly were becoming all black, with increases of over 20 percent in the proportion of each school's black population in the three-year period. Center Park, the elementary school serving Lockhaven children, remained all white, while the Imperial Village schools, Kew and Bennett, were beginning to get some black children.

TABLE 3


Black Enrollment in Inglewood Schools, 1966-69

School	Enrollment					
	1966-67		1967-68		1968-69	
	Percent Black	Total	Percent Black	Total	Percent Black	Total
West Side Schools						
Elementary						
Frank D. Parent	0.0	714	0.3	670	0.6	621
La Tijera	2.0	349	1.9	421	2.0	349
Highland	0.0	450	0.0	450	0.0	437
Centinela	0.3	798	2.0	815	2.1	852
W. Claude Hudnall	0.0	182	0.0	192	0.0	183
Oak Street	0.4	489	0.4	520	0.9	530
William H. Kelso	0.5	423	0.5	370	0.6	346
Beulah Payne	0.0	246	0.0	237	0.0	259
Secondary						
George W. Crozier						
Junior High	0.2	1,047	0.3	1,060	0.4	1,050
Inglewood High School	0.1	2,332	0.1	2,361	0.3	2,324
East Side Schools						
Elementary						
Daniel Freeman	56.9	431	68.1	439	78.2	457
Warren Lane	38.9	519	52.7	577	62.5	584
Clyde Woodworth	12.6	896	19.4	964	31.4	1,041
Center Park	0.1	976	0.2	1,005	0.1	1,033
Kew-Bennett*	0.0	424	3.8	501	6.9	507
Secondary						
Albert Monroe						
Junior High	13.4	946	20.5	995	32.4	973
Morningside High School	9.5	1,984	17.0	1,941	23.0	1,936
Total	6.7	13,206	10.2	13,518	13.5	13,882

*This attendance zone is served by two schools: Andrew Bennett (kindergarten through third grade) and James Kew (grades 4-6).

MAP 2

Schools of the Inglewood Unified School District



MAP 2

INGLEWOOD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

The secondary schools on the east side, which take in students from all these schools, show the same trends: an increasing percentage of black pupils, with the rate of increase somewhat muted by the inclusion of Center Park and Kew-Bennett among the feeder schools.

The sharp increases in the percentage of black students in Freeman, Warren Lane, and Woodworth are proceeding more rapidly than the demographic changes in the neighborhoods from which they draw. For example, according to the 1969 census, only 27 percent of the households in the Freeman attendance area were black, compared to 78 percent of the student body.¹

CAUSES OF RAPID SCHOOL RESEGREGATION

At the root of rapid resegregation of the schools is the fact that whites with school-age children are withdrawing them from the public schools or leaving the area. The process is aided by the greater mobility of younger families with school-age children, both black and white.

The data show marked discrepancies in the age distributions of black and white populations in the integrated areas. Thus, in 1970 roughly 45 percent of the blacks in the Freeman attendance area were 24 years or younger, while for whites the corresponding figure is about 20 percent. In the Warren Lane zone about 51 percent of the black residents were under 24 compared to about 22 percent of the whites.

Part of these marked differences are a result of an aging white population in Morningside Park before black in-migration began. In 1960 the median age for the neighborhood was between 40 and 49 years. But contributing factors were attitudes toward the schools and differential opportunities for mobility between old and young. Younger white families with children are more likely to move out than older families because of their fears concerning integrated or black schools. They also find it easier to move because they are nearing their peak earning years and can afford to invest in a new house more readily than an elderly couple with a fixed income. In addition, young families probably find it easier to tear up their "roots" and get reestablished in another community. This mobility of the young applies also to black families moving in. Black families with young children would be more likely to move to Inglewood than older couples because of the attraction of the schools (which have a reputation for excellence, are undoubtedly better than most of the ghetto schools that the black families are leaving, and would provide an integrated experience). Thus, one would expect that part of the marked age discrepancy between blacks and whites can be accounted for by two parallel processes: younger whites moving out in search of better schools and younger blacks moving in for the same reason.

By 1969 the black-white proportion in several of the east side schools had reached a point where even ardent integrationists were contemplating seriously the question of whether they should remain or leave. One active leader of Inglewood Neighbors described the situation in her children's school.

Freeman is about 80 percent black now, with a school population of about 475. Some of the white pupils are from a Baptist orphanage in the area. One of the white families who send their children to the public school is a white liberal who is running for the school board. This means that there are around 20 other white families who still voluntarily send their children to Freeman, and a large proportion of these have kids who are in the sixth grade and are sticking it out until their kids are out of school.

White Concerns and Fears

Not only do the schools resegregate faster than the neighborhoods; changes in the schools contribute to the process of neighborhood resegregation. This is due to concerns that develop among white parents about the nature of integrated education. The report of the Commission on Civil Rights suggests that these concerns are widespread.

Integrationists and segregationists alike implicitly agree that the proportion of Negroes in a school defines the quality of a school. Whether negative characteristics are seen as a consequence of discrimination or bigotry, or whether the ethos of the school is believed to be affected by the predominance of presumably ill-motivated and academically retarded youths, color stigmatizes the institution as well as the individual.²

In general, the educational professionals perceive this to be a problem that calls for upgrading the educational performance of black children through compensatory education and school desegregation.³ Their normative perspective seems to be that it is the duty of whites to tolerate problems that new programs create for them. Yet, in deemphasizing the concerns of whites, the school professionals are running the risk of alienating the very persons who, through their contacts with blacks, are the presumed instruments of upgraded black education.

The schools on the east side were, temporarily at least, integrated rather than all-black schools. For the west side they provided a model of what integrated schools were like. On the east side families were

having to deal with the problems that arose directly. This study does not pretend to present a complete picture of all the costs and benefits to the students in the integrated schools. Rather, it emphasizes the concerns of community residents. In some instances they had access to information. In others they responded to isolated incidents and rumor. Herein will be described, as best possible, the conditions in the schools that concerned the people of Inglewood.

CHANGES IN THE EAST SIDE SCHOOLS

In terms of quality of physical plant the east side schools of Inglewood are generally in better condition than those on the west side. They were built more recently and are larger and more modern. In contrast, some of the west side schools are too small and uneconomical to run (according to the suggested optimum size for an elementary school of 10 acres and 400 to 600 pupils). Physical deterioration was not a cause for alarm.

Academic Performance

Proponents of integrated education believe that it can have a number of academic and social benefits; but perhaps the single most significant outcome that they project is improvement in the academic performance of black children. Experience with integrated education has not provided conclusive evidence in support of this proposition.⁴ On the other hand, opponents of desegregation fear that it will lead to deterioration of academic performance in the desegregated schools. Available evidence suggests that the performance of white children is little affected by the introduction of small proportions of black students.⁵

While there are no data to support or contradict either of these two contentions in terms of the performance of individual students in Inglewood, there are data available indicating that the influx of black pupils has depressed average achievement scores in the integrated schools. For instance, at the elementary level tests administered to sixth graders in 1967 were examined (measuring verbal and nonverbal IQ by the Lorge Thorndike and word- and paragraph-meaning by the Stanford Achievement Test). Freeman, Warren Lane, and Woodworth, all integrated schools, scored in the lowest five of the thirteen elementary schools in the district.⁶ This cannot be accounted for by socioeconomic factors, since of the three only Woodworth showed low enough family incomes to receive money under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act for compensatory programs. The other

elementary schools in the district that received such funds were Centinela in North Inglewood; Oak Street, Hudnall, and Kelso in Central Inglewood; and Center Park in Lockhaven.⁷ Apart from minority status socioeconomic status (SES) is related generally to achievement and IQ test results in the district. The schools showing the highest scores are Parent and La Tijera in wealthy Ladera Heights. Kew-Bennett in Imperial Village falls next; Center Park, in the run-down neighborhood of Lockhaven, is among the lowest.

Within the integrated schools, the academic achievement of blacks does not match that of whites. For instance, the Bureau of Intergroup Relations collected data for 1967 on the percentage of blacks in various classes in Morningside High (see Table 4). The data show clearly that blacks are disproportionately represented in remedial classes and underrepresented in advanced classes.

Most of the black students in the district have transferred in from the mammoth Los Angeles City School District. There is a general belief in the community that Inglewood schools are far superior to those of Los Angeles and that black children enter with a severe handicap because of this. As one PTA member said, "Children coming in in upper grades from Los Angeles schools or elsewhere are behind in their education and so tend to pull down the quality of the school." Whether lower average achievement scores have any impact on the quality of education for white or black students is an open question. Seeing these average scores decline, however, does not provide comfort or assurance to the white parents of Inglewood.

Curriculum

One reason for the lower performance of black relative to white students at Morningside High may lie in the lack of response to the peculiar needs of the former. One teacher at Morningside put it this way:

In general, there have been almost no attempts made to unleash the buried talents of Negro students. Only two out of 85 students in the Scholarship Society are Negro. Usually only zero or one out of every honors class is a Negro. The highest IQ score for any sophomore Negro boy is 115. There have been no serious attempts to induce potentially talented Negro students to enroll in the tough elective courses offered by the Mathematics, Science and Foreign Language Departments.

School administrators talked about changes in curriculum in response to the special needs of black students, but very little change

TABLE 4

Percentage of Students in Ability-Grouped Classes
Who Are Black, Morningside High, 1967

Class	Percent Black
World history	
Remedial	46.1
Low	20.9
Medium	14.5
High	9.8
English I	
Remedial	33.3
Low	16.2
Medium	17.2
High	6.2
Honors	6.2
College preparatory science	
Biology	18.1
Chemistry	9.9
Physiology	8.3
Physics	5.9
English IV	
Remedial	17.6
Middle	13.8
Honors	0.0
Mathematics	
Math skills	41.7
Math I	18.6
Pre-algebra	16.6
Algebra I	10.4
Algebra II	9.1
Geometry	10.7
Math analysis	0.0
Calculus	0.0

Source: Report of the Bureau of Intergroup Relations, California Department of Education (Inglewood, June, 1969), pp. 14-15.

SCHOOLS

37

had actually occurred. For the most part the faculties were content to continue teaching their traditional curriculum, and those who tried to introduce change were likely to find that the system was not geared for innovation. Thus, a black human relations specialist working for the district said that he kept the schools apprised of events that were of significance to the black community, such as Martin Luther King's birthday, the anniversary of the assassination of Malcolm X, or Negro History Week. He said that only three schools had inquired about Negro History Week and that he had stacks of material waiting to be given around as soon as the schools expressed an interest. He saw the school administrators as more of a stumbling block than the teachers:

The superintendent comes in and says, "Action, action, action." And then the teachers say, "Fine, let's have action. But what do you want us to do?" And there are no directives on which way to go. One teacher did try action; he set up a black history course. It was shot down by the administration. They said he had failed to go through the proper channels to have the course cleared.

The black students in the district feel this lack of responsiveness. Thus, one resident reported,

At Monroe Junior High some black students wanted to celebrate Martin Luther King's birthday. They appealed to the administration, but they didn't do anything about it. The human relations specialist was called in, and he tried to patch it up. Apparently there was a small celebration, but it was too late and indicated clearly to the students how unresponsive the administration is to their desires.

In a written report of his experiences at Morningside High, one teacher mentioned that "if black life is discussed in English or Social Studies classes, the black usually hears only about slavery, backward Africa, ghetto life, and problems of black-white relations." He reported some success in his personal efforts to remedy the situation.

At the start of this academic year, I persuaded two other teachers to join me in a Curriculum Review Committee whose purpose was to examine our courses and guidance program to see what changes needed to be made in our integrated school. This is an officially recognized committee. Our main efforts so far have been to persuade English and Social Studies teachers to eliminate their almost total

emphasis on life and culture of white Americans and "civilized Europe."

A teachers survey conducted by the Bureau of Intergroup Relations in 1967 found that 78.3 percent of the teachers felt a need for curriculum materials, films, and formal classroom study dealing with the history and contributions of minority groups in the United States.⁸ (It might be noted that in 1967 only 1 of the certified employees out of a total of 51 at Monroe Junior High was black, while 5 out of 96 were black at Morningside High.⁹)

Student Race Relations

The aspect of integrated education that is most difficult to assess is the effect that it has upon feelings between the races. The Civil Rights Commission study shows that some students in integrated schools break down racial barriers and others do not. The black students with higher academic performance and those who engage in interracial activities are more likely to develop friendships with white students.¹⁰

In keeping with these findings, school activities at Morningside High did provide a basis for improved social relationships. The report of the Morningside teacher cited above summarizes his perception of these developments:

White boys were rather hostile in 1963-1964. There is outward acceptance now . . . The school staff conducted an informal acceptance campaign. White student leaders came out against prejudice. Student leaders have tried to balance "white music" with "soul music" at school dances. Students have elected Negroes to high offices in student government. After a vigorous campaign, we persuaded students to approve the addition of a new group of spirit leaders who have "rhythm" routines for our frequent rallies and sporting events. The subsequent elections resulted in three Negro girls being elected to the Pep Squad which had previously been all white.¹¹

On the other hand, the interracial educational experience was also producing serious animosities. Students and adults told of ways in which the schools were breeding intolerance and resentment. In some cases white students who had entered high school with a strong belief in equality of opportunity and the justice of the black cause came out feeling strongly antiblack.

There were a number of bases for resentment between white and black students. There was a marked tendency for racial groups to stick together socially. Another source of tension stemmed from an imbalance in dating relationships; black boys dated white girls but white boys did not date black girls. On occasion black girls expressed strong resentment toward white girls. There was some resentment concerning preferential treatment for members of the opposite group by teachers (an issue to be discussed in more detail below).

There was an even more fundamental basis for conflict, however. The black position is well stated in the written report by the Morningside High teacher:

Black students do not want to be a minority of 10 percent in a school as they are in the nation. On the basis of their personal (or family) experiences, they feel they would be cheated. They would be outnumbered in the many different types of school elections and decisions. They feel, in brief, they would be powerless. They feel that at Morningside High School they are on the fringes or frontier of black life (i.e., central Los Angeles). Their friends in the heartland usually haven't heard about M.H.S. The norm tends to be central schools like Washington, Fremont, Manual Arts, and L.A. High. Sports and student government contacts are usually with white suburban high schools. There is very limited contact with black and integrated high schools. Black students view ghetto schools differently than do white students. They usually ignore the violence of black schools. They usually say that the greatest weakness of black schools is poor teachers.¹²

To deal with some of their problems and feelings the black students at Morningside High formed a Black Students' Union (BSU) in 1969. This created some concern on the part of some of the black parents who, after all, had chosen to move to an integrated community. It greatly disturbed elements in the white adult community. One conservative board member voiced his objections: "Why is it that the black students require a Black Students' Union instead of just becoming a part of an integrated student body that has existed there for some period of time?" Undoubtedly there was an additional fear that a BSU spells militancy, demands that have to be dealt with, and perhaps violence. The formation of the BSU also concerned white students who wanted to see school loyalty predominate and felt rejected in the face of efforts not to be prejudiced.

Among the white students there was a fatalistic belief that Monroe and Morningside would inevitably become ghetto schools. And, as with their black counterparts, they did not wish to attend predominantly black schools.

Discipline and Juvenile Delinquency

Another emotion-charged issue in the white community was the fear of an increase of discipline problems and delinquency in the integrated schools. Not everyone blamed the supposed increase on black students. As one teacher pointed out, "Discipline is more difficult these days but I can't attribute that to the influx of Negro children. It's just the age: less respect for parents, and so on. Many of the poor whites who are moving into Inglewood are more of a problem than the Negro children." Nevertheless, the bulk of discipline problems were perceived to stem either from black students or from the fact of racial conflict between the two elements of the student body. Mention was made of many racial incidents that had occurred at Morningside High. A school board member reported that "students have been threatened when they come out of the classroom that they are going to be beaten up and robbed of their belongings."

Objective evidence on discipline problems is hard to obtain. The two indicators that were available show no definite trend. If police contacts are a good indicator of real discipline problems (a questionable assumption, as many criminologists have pointed out), then Morningside High experienced slightly more "trouble" than Inglewood High School: 6.3 percent compared to 4.7 percent in 1967-68.¹³ For the junior high schools, however, all-white Crozier had slightly more "trouble" than integrated Monroe: 2.2 percent compared to 1.7 percent. The proportion of blacks included in this group was slightly higher than their representation in the student body of their school in one case and about proportional in the other. At Morningside High 26.2 percent of those contacted were black (in that year they comprised 17 percent of the student body), and at Monroe 17.6 percent were black (compared to 20.5 percent of the students).

Suspensions from school are perhaps a better indicator of problems in the schools. Both high schools showed about the same rate of suspensions in 1967-68, namely 7.2 percent. For Morningside, blacks were somewhat overrepresented at 27.5 percent compared to their 17-percent rate in the school population. Monroe showed a higher suspension rate than Crozier for that year: 10.4 percent vs. 4.1 percent. Of the former, 53.8 percent were black.¹⁴

Racial conflict in the schools is found to be destructive by members of the community. A woman who is active in the PTA described her perceptions:

The children in the east side schools are under a lot of tension, Negro as well as white. I've seen the tension drop from white children as they transfer out of one of these schools to a school west of Prairie. Then the child becomes

more relaxed. The tension is caused by riots, boycotts, the dropping of a word or two. When a Negro and a white child are fighting, it isn't just a fight. Ten Negro children come and pounce on the white and it becomes a big thing. It is natural for children in junior high and high school to fight occasionally, but the racial situation changes the nature of fights. People won't move out of Morningside Park as long as safety is maintained. Many whites actually prefer to live in an integrated neighborhood. But when their children get beaten up they will leave.

Incidents of violence affect not only the parents but also the teachers. One teacher who worked on the west side spoke of her personal fears: "If I taught school in such an area [i.e., Morningside Park] I would be frightened. I have to stay after school many evenings and I would be frightened to if I were in a Negro school." Another teacher said, "If my school were to become all black, I'd probably leave Inglewood and take a \$3,000 salary cut."

The data do not measure the distribution or depth of these feelings in the community at large. It is felt here, as by many of the respondents, that feelings of concern, if not fear, were widespread. Such feelings contribute to antidesegregation sentiment. A leader of the opposition to school desegregation expressed his opinion in clear terms: "Integrated schools become dangerous. It is absolutely wrong to push for desegregation."

Teachers' Handling of Discipline

The management of discipline in integrated schools was a particularly sensitive problem. It was frequently asserted that teachers treated black and white students differently. There was no consensus about the direction of discrimination, however. On the one hand, one informant said, "Many teachers have claimed they feel uncomfortable with black students, and there are many horror stories about teacher insensitivities toward black students."

The most commonly heard complaint, however, often voiced by persons whose views are in most other respects divergent, was that black students were given preferential treatment. A liberal stated it this way: "My guess is that there is preferential treatment for the black kids. The teachers lean over backwards not to discipline the black kids. I figure they don't want to be accused of discrimination." An Inglewood moderate said, "The problem is that the Negro children are undercorrected and the white children are overcorrected. This leads to resentment on the part of the white children. For example, one teacher promised a free lunch to her Negro students if they

behaved well." It was also reported that if a line of waiting students had to be broken up because of lunch hour the student left at the front of the line would invariably be white so that the teacher would not have to turn down a black student.

The results of the teachers' survey support these impressions. Thus, 37.8 percent of the teachers saw the problems of maintaining consistent discipline in schools where there is a significant black population as very serious. An additional 40.5 percent saw them as serious, whereas only 21.7 percent described them as no more serious than in other schools. As one teacher put it, "Too many teachers 'look the other way' when Negro students misbehave. Every student should be required to conduct himself properly at all times." And another said, "All discipline should be without regard to race, but this might present a problem to a teacher who is trying to be overly kind or to one who is afraid of being misunderstood."¹⁵ In the words of one parent,

Many teachers are incompetent to deal with black kids at the level of emotions, are unsure of their own motivations, and are very sure that they do not want to have to deal with irate black parents, or challenges to their own authority by escalating student reaction to discipline.

As has been already noted, white reaction to this type of preferential treatment is not favorable. Black student and family reaction is more mixed. Many claimed that black parents were unhappy with it and wanted their children disciplined: "I think most black parents would say they want their kids disciplined. They want all kids treated equally, and when the kid does something wrong they want him disciplined." One woman had recently been to a meeting at Monroe Junior High attended by both black and white parents, where some of these issues were discussed. She said, "Negro parents are angry because they are not being informed about when their children get into trouble. They want to know. White parents are angry about the same thing, that the Negro children aren't being dealt with."

But there is another side. Both parents and students among the blacks are concerned that the discipline meted out may not be fair—that it may be colored by teachers' prejudices. One white liberal pointed out that special leniency to black students only confirmed their view that the teachers were prejudiced. He summed up the teachers' predicament in this way:

The teachers can't win either way. As a minority in the district and having the problems that they have, the black kids are going to distrust the teachers anyway, no matter what overt action is taken. Nothing is going to convince many of them at this point that the teachers are acting fairly.

From the parents' point of view, "there are probably not too many teachers that we would trust to discipline fairly." One less-sympathetic PTA member saw it this way:

A lot of the Negro parents are working and don't have the time to deal with these problems. The PTA tries to call them and tell them what their children are doing. We are trying to encourage parental control. Some are cooperative but many feel, "Why are you picking on us?" They have a chip on their shoulder.

The degree to which teachers are in reality biased in one direction or the other in either their attitudes or behavior is difficult to ascertain. But a situation in which this type of accusation and counter-accusation is prevalent does not provide an ideal work atmosphere. So far, surprisingly, given the pressures they have been under, there has been no significant increase in teacher turnover in the integrated schools. The president of the Inglewood Teachers Association, a fourth grade teacher in a west side school, attributed this to the fact that the Inglewood school system paid high salaries and offered excellent job benefits. Before long, however, it can be expected that the official figures will begin to show an increase in turnover, since there is already talk of it informally.

One woman who was active in the PTA said, "There are personnel problems. Our current teachers are not accustomed to dealing with an integrated environment and so they either do it poorly or choose to leave. When they leave, they are replaced by younger, less experienced teachers." This, of course, encourages the expected deterioration in quality. One high school teacher who was planning to leave because of integration gave reasons that included both the factors discussed here and the lowering of academic standards:

Integration has lowered the quality of students at Morning-side High. The achievement scores have gone down. This is because kids who want to go to college have to take my course [in advanced mathematics] but they don't have the entrance qualifications. Should I admit them anyway and lower the quality of the course for everyone? Should I refuse them admittance? Then I get accused of racism. If the school sets up special programs such as extra summer school sessions, the Negro kids ask why they should have to do extra work when others don't.

This teacher feels that he wants to teach his subject. He does not want to have to deal with this type of social problem.

CONCLUSIONS

The fears that developed about desegregated education among white parents varied from concern over the quality of education to worries about morale on campus. If one were to isolate one predominant concern, however, it would have to be fear of the life styles of black youth in general and of black violence in particular. There is a widespread belief that black children engage in more violence, and talk of "discipline" was a euphemism for this concern. As is probably typical of parents everywhere, the majority of Inglewood residents did not pay close heed to such matters as curriculum, class size, or teacher competence. Considerable decline could occur on these dimensions before many would notice it. But one incident of violence would reverberate through the white community, undoubtedly precipitating some white flight.

As shall be described in Chapter 5, the leaders of the school district recognized that integrated education created many new problems. They instituted a human relations committee, engaged in some in-service training, and so on. Eventually they brought in the Bureau of Intergroup Relations (BIR) to conduct the study referred to throughout this chapter.

Whether or not these and other efforts were responsive to the needs of black children is questionable. They did little to alleviate the fears of whites. One school board member was willing frankly to identify the issues from the point of view of many of Inglewood's white residents. The following extended quotation is taken from a statement that he made during a school board meeting.

Is there anyone here who can state in all honesty that the education being received by all the students regardless of color at Morningside or Monroe is as good as it was three years ago? And yet these students have been studying in an integrated atmosphere. Is there anyone in this audience who can state that the conflict of the students in these two schools is conducive to good learning? Is there anyone here that will say in all honesty that the teachers feel as much at ease in teaching, and have the attention of the students, and are able to give the students the knowledge they are intended to give? And are the students as eager to learn the academic subjects as when they first came to Morningside or Monroe? Is there anyone here who can truthfully say school spirit on the Morningside and Monroe campuses is as good as it was three years ago? And would anyone hesitate to guess how many

students have been sent to private schools, or have dropped out in the last three years instead of finishing their educational studies in the public schools?¹⁶

These were the kinds of concerns that were motivating people to withdraw their children from Inglewood's schools.

Concerns about the deterioration of schools and the rapid transition of neighborhoods were at the heart of the issue that confronted the school board and citizens of Inglewood. These concerns were shared by all those who took an active interest in the problem. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the whole range of interests that the desegregation issue produced.

The strikingly divergent views as to whether school desegregation would alleviate or exacerbate these problems result in part from residence. Those who resided in integrated neighborhoods wanted school and neighborhood integration to be spread more evenly throughout the city. Those who lived in white neighborhoods tended to resist, arguing that school desegregation would speed up a process of resegregation in the whole city. There was also, of course, an overlay of conflicting ideologies that predisposed positive or negative responses to the concept of desegregation.

The investigation of the content of opinion was guided by an explicit interest group model.¹ Spokesmen for organizations across the spectrum from pro- to antidesegregation were sought out and interviewed. For a number of reasons, traditional leadership groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce and PTA, were not adequate vehicles for the expression of the interests that developed.² A pro-desegregation group, Inglewood Neighbors, and an antidesegregation group, the Neighborhood Schools Committee, played far more important roles. This chapter describes both these ad hoc groups that rose to prominence and some of the traditional groups that in this instance were more peripheral.

Attempting to assess the content of interest-group positions is no simple matter. First, since the community as a whole was not surveyed, one must depend upon the information provided by activists.

Although this undoubtedly produces some distortion, it is not a serious shortcoming because the views as expressed by activists are the ones that dominate the public arena.

Second, individuals may vary in the degree to which they are aware of their interests. Often, people are unable or unwilling to articulate their needs but still act to further them. The absence of an overt statement by an individual that he is pursuing a particular interest does not mean that he is not "motivated" by it.

Third, individuals or groups may mask their interests as a matter of strategy. In the case of school desegregation it is often found to be more useful tactically to engage in moralistic rhetoric than to express directly the content of a group's interest. The public debate tends to be about general principles and the good of the community rather than about the particular, vital interests at stake.

Fortunately, people often are willing to express themselves more frankly and openly in private interviews than before the public. Sometimes the investigator is aided by the sharp observations of a group's opponents, who can cut through the rhetoric to the core of its interests. Finally, the investigator sometimes may engage in careful inference about some aspect of a group's interest. The data, although not as complete as one would like them to be, enable one to lay out the range of opinions that were relevant to the controversy.

PRODESEGREGATION GROUPS

Inglewood Neighbors

The principle organizational proponent for desegregation was a group called Inglewood Neighbors (previously Morningside Park Neighbors). It was organized in 1965, shortly before the Watts riots. Until the summer of 1968 its membership, which at times was as high as 1,300, consisted almost entirely of whites residing in the eastern, integrated section of Inglewood. After 1968 the group became almost one-third black.

Its initial publication described the purpose of Inglewood Neighbors as being to "build a stable integrated community." This referred first of all to the Morningside area but included a strategy for stabilization of the whole city. They wanted to keep white families from moving out of the Morningside area and also to encourage whites to move in.

The leadership argued that quality schools and racial desegregation could prevent the community from becoming all black. One member of Inglewood Neighbors gave a clear explanation of the way

in which he and other members of the organization analyzed the relationship between school desegregation and neighborhood demography:

If nothing is done, the community is going to turn black. Now the question is, what is going to make it into a Negro community? No one can say for sure what will make for resegregation. One of the conservative leaders is saying that school desegregation will speed up resegregation. Now there is no telling which of us is right. The only thing we can say is that a community like Compton did not desegregate and it resegregated, and it seems to us that Compton is the closest model to Inglewood. I believe that if they refuse to sell to blacks, and build up a racist campaign and say "We're maintaining this side as all white," they will be retreating block by block. But it is still going to happen, though it may take a long time. Inglewood was a racist community some ten years ago. A black couldn't buy property here until six years ago. The population pattern that developed over the last decade is still taking place in the face of the most extreme opposition. With the laws they have today, there would be no more firm opposition than has existed in the past, and yet the black community has still continued to move across Inglewood. And so the only thing I can say is that we can't guarantee that desegregation is going to stop this, but we can guarantee that if nothing is done, it's not going to stop.

A member of the Stabilization Committee made the same general point in this way:

Inglewood's problems would be solved if we declared for open housing. If realtors showed homes all over, then no area would become densely Negro. After all, they are only ten percent of the American population. If the community worked together with the realtors, it could be done. They say if they do anything to integrate they will lose the other side of town. I feel by doing nothing, they are doing something. They will lose the east side if they do nothing.

School desegregation was seen as the focal point, because, as another respondent noted,

The school picture affects housing. We can't do anything about housing. All we can do something about is the schools. We can't do anything about stopping more blacks

from moving in except by stopping whites from moving out. And one of the ways of stopping whites from moving out of Morningside Park is to lower the percentage of Negroes in the schools.

The strategy of desegregating the schools was supposed to ease the tension in those schools experiencing racial problems, making a more comfortable situation for teachers (by having a smaller percentage of black students) and enabling them to deal more effectively with problems. In addition, it was intended to involve the entire community in all the schools:

With a minority school, they become less concerned. But when it is their own school with their own kids attending, then they care. By desegregating you reduce the possibility of people saying, "Well, this is my school. I don't care about the others." The whole district becomes pretty concerned.

The public pronouncements of Inglewood Neighbors took the form of arguing that integration is the moral position, that quality education is equated with integrated education for both white and black children (though especially for the latter), and that people who hold a contrary view are racists and bigots. Others questioned the sincerity of this position. A moderate school board member saw it this way: "They want to spread their problem around so that it will not be focused on them. They have a perfectly reasonable problem, but I don't accept their line of being bleeding heart liberals."

One of the black residents, an advocate of integration, said:

Perhaps by taking such an outspoken position, they have become part of the problem. Why should they go to other people living west of Prairie and tell them that the community should become integrated—that it would be good for them? The people west of Prairie have a distrust for that kind of approach. They think, "Come on, what are you trying to put over on us? You are offering integration because you are living in Morningside Park and you are threatened. So don't come on with the big moral bit. It is obvious you are talking about your own self interest, and you want to foist your problems on us. You live in Morningside Park. That's your problem, not mine."

There is a basic truth in this accusation, but it is not the entire truth. Members of Inglewood Neighbors believed, as has been seen, that school integration is not only a solution to their problem but also that it is the only solution to the problem facing the whole of Inglewood: that it will become another Compton.

Members of Inglewood Neighbors were equally willing to impugn the motives of their opponents. "They are not concerned with the logical argument about which process is going to prevent Inglewood from becoming another Compton. It is a fear of blacks that is the motivating factor. Their whole ideology is irrational. It is based on certain psychological fears." A leader of Inglewood Neighbors believed that it was impossible to conduct a meaningful dialogue or to attempt to persuade these opponents that their interests would be served by desegregating. Instead, the approach was to try to force school desegregation, through pressure on the school board and through the courts. As one integrationist put it: "I don't want to change their attitudes. I want to change their situation, so they will come to change their attitudes." It was assumed that contact with blacks in the school situation would help overcome fears. They recognized that contact might be counterproductive, and so they also urged aid to the schools in the form of in-service training for the teachers and other devices that they hoped would make the desegregation process go smoothly.

Within the Inglewood context Inglewood Neighbors was viewed as a radical organization. One of its leaders was described by a school board member as a troublemaker and a destructive force because he had tried to organize a school boycott. A school board candidate said, "Inglewood Neighbors has a leadership which gives the organization a bad name."

Inglewood Neighbors was an organized ongoing pressure group. Its leaders maintained communication with the membership. The group was active on several fronts, including putting pressure on the city council to establish a stabilization committee, holding a conference in 1967 on problems in the areas of schools, police, real estate, and so on. For the most part, the leaders were young parents of school-age children. They were often outspoken in the presentation of their positions and criticisms of public officials. Of all the groups involved in the controversy, this was the most organized and visible.

Parents Interested in Education

Parents Interested in Education (PIE) was a group of black parents that came into existence in 1968 at the prodding of a black member of the school administration. There was an obvious coincidence of interests between PIE and Inglewood Neighbors, but there was some

feeling expressed that this existed only on some issues. One potential area of divergence concerned stabilization itself. It has already been pointed out that most of the blacks in Inglewood are middle class and want to live in an integrated area, but their position is more ambivalent than that of white liberals. One black resident stated it as follows:

It is in the interest of the black community of Morningside Park to stabilize Morningside Park as a whole and yet, given the current movement among black revolutionaries, this creates certain internal conflicts for the black people. They want to make this an integrated community, somewhat contrary to some of the separatist talk that is going around. But you've got to see that people are at heart really committed to integration. Not only is it the commitment to separatism that might be a conflict, but it is the idea that, for integration to work in Inglewood, you have to keep black people out. That means saying, "I have made it into Inglewood, but I am not going to let my brother move in here." And that is very difficult policy for the black community to follow.

Another black resident said, "If whites move out, Inglewood will become another Compton. I wouldn't like that, but if they move out, that's their problem, not mine." That is hardly a view that could be shared by Inglewood Neighbors.

Another divergence from Inglewood Neighbors concerns PIE's relationship with their children, who were considerably more radical than their parents. "Some of the men in PIE maintain links with the BSU, and they are a moderating force. They try to explain or give some alternatives to the young people that might not occur to them." The integrationist blacks were trying to occupy a middle ground:

Integration isn't that painful. It will come about. And it is only as expensive as you want it to be. There are many black residents who will try to restrain the dissidents. But I also try to persuade them that, if something isn't done, this dissident element will be harder and harder to control.

PIE was a loosely organized group of men who saw themselves as temporary spokesmen for the point of view of black parents. As one of the leaders put it:

The group has no official structure, no constitution, no regular meetings, no position papers that it publishes.

It is simply a group of black parents who get together to discuss education in Inglewood. Almost all activities undertaken by members are on an individual basis.

As will be described more fully below, the main role that PIE played in the desegregation controversy was to present a list of fourteen demands to the school board. In general, the demands called for improved, integrated education.

Except for that incident, PIE was not a visible force in Inglewood. There was no evidence of animosity directed at it as it was directed at Inglewood Neighbors. The administrator who had encouraged black parents to organize felt that PIE's emergence was welcomed by the school board. "PIE partly came into existence because members of the school board said to the leadership of Inglewood Neighbors, 'You can't speak for the black community. We want to hear from the black community.'"

Citizens for the Three Rs

The Citizens for the Three Rs represents a third kind of group both in terms of its purposes and organization. The membership resided primarily in the areas east of Prairie and was therefore much concerned about desegregation. A large number of members were from the PTA; as one said, "It was started by PTA people who wanted to be active politically and couldn't within the PTA."

She indicated that Citizens for the Three Rs shared many of the goals of Inglewood Neighbors but wanted to avoid that organization's radical image. They wanted a more moderate organization capable of bringing together liberals and conservatives with common concerns about the quality of education.

One respondent described the goals of the organization in the following terms:

One, we want to deal with integration realistically. And two, we want to maintain quality within what are now de facto segregated schools. Many of our children go to integrated schools now. I'm not about to move out of the community, and I want to make sure that the schools my children attend do not deteriorate.

It is interesting to note that this woman is a resident of Imperial Village, and thus is not faced with almost entirely black elementary schools. This is in contrast with the leaders of Inglewood Neighbors, many of whom reside in Morningside Park.

A major emphasis of the group's activity was on improving the quality of school board members. "A number of the school board members have been on the board too long—some as long as 18 years. These people are too devoted to defending past mistakes rather than building for the future." Toward that end, the group screened prospective school board candidates and selected a slate of candidates that it would support. In the 1969 election it interviewed eight potential candidates and decided to support two. One of the two, an outspoken liberal, was elected.

In the Citizens for the Three Rs one sees members of an existing, moderate organization, the PTA, seeking new forms of active participation in school policy-making. They were community activists with extensive behind-the-scenes channels of communication among those parents who are most interested in the schools. Under certain conditions, particularly when voter turnout is low, their active endorsement of school board candidates could be an effective strategy.

THE MIDDLE GROUND

There is no clear-cut or easily identifiable middle ground in Inglewood, and the people disagreed over where the "silent majority" stood on the issue of school desegregation. Since a citywide survey was not conducted, it is impossible to know for sure, but data on political behavior indicated a generally conservative political climate. While there is a significant Democratic lead in party registration (in 1970 the party breakdown was about 56 percent Democrat, 43 percent Republican, 1 percent American Independence Party, and less than 1 percent Peace and Freedom Party), like other similar areas in Los Angeles County, Inglewood tends to vote Republican.³ Many nominal Democrats are conservative on today's issues and vote accordingly, a tendency that has been noted by a number of writers.⁴

In the 1964 general election Goldwater led Johnson in Inglewood by 54 percent to 46 percent. In that election California had a statewide referendum to repeal all existing fair-housing legislation and to prohibit the enactment of such laws in the future, known as Proposition 14. Eighty-three percent of the voters of Inglewood supported this measure. In the 1966 gubernatorial race 68 percent of Inglewood voted for Ronald Reagan over Democratic Governor Brown. In 1968 39 percent voted for Humphrey, 54 percent for Nixon, and 7 percent for George Wallace. Finally, in 1970 about 53 percent voted for Reagan over the Democratic candidate for governor, and Inglewood resident, Jesse Unruh. It should be noted that as time moves on these figures are more and more affected by the new black residents, who tend to vote Democratic. Thus, more of the white residents vote in a conservative direction than the totals indicate.

The following quotations illustrate how some Inglewood citizens viewed majority opinions:

Seventy-five percent of Inglewood is right-wing in attitude, but not in terms of behavior. A large proportion is apathetic, and is going to accept whatever the district does.

The people are basically in favor of integration, but they are concerned about what other communities will think of them. If Inglewood were to come out for integration, what would Burbank think and what would Glendale think?

Most of the city is not hard-core conservative. They are waiting with open arms for a constructive solution that would satisfy all groups. Many who used to be anti any program are now open-minded and waiting.

Seventy-five to eighty percent of the city are hard-core segregationists.

The community is basically conservative, and against integration, for neighborhood schools, and against bussing. These interests are not well organized, but they are commonly known.

A pretty large percentage of the people in central and northern Inglewood are diehard racists.

One is left with the tentative conclusion that Inglewood was a generally conservative community and that some significant proportion of the city fell into the antidesegregation camp. Others ranged from apathetic to being open to an integration plan. It is this latter group that shall be considered to be moderates.

There are two other points of view that the respondents attributed to the general population of Inglewood. One was a great concern over taxes, hence a fear that any change might be costly. A teacher said, "Much of the property in Inglewood is owned by old retired people who are strongly opposed to higher taxes and bond issues." Another resident described the population as "fiscally conservative," an attitude reflected in the fact that, at the time of the study, the city had no bonded indebtedness. This was a source of great pride to many. The second general attitude was a sense of tradition about the schools—a desire to send one's children to Inglewood High School because he went there. Since it lends itself to an antibussing position, this sentiment will be considered in a little more detail when looking at that position.

Some of the moderates belonged to organizations, and an attempt was made to find out whether these took any stance with regard to the issue of school desegregation. There are, as in any American city, many forms of community activity and organization. Three were looked at—the Chamber of Commerce, the PTA, and the Inglewood Teachers Association. In each was found divided opinion and a rather passive stance in regard to school desegregation.

The PTA

In general, the PTA reflected a range of opinion that related roughly to the location of the schools of its members. While the Citizens for the Three Rs were mainly people from the east side, the Beulah Payne PTA included many members who were strongly antibussing.

The PTA council in Inglewood had about sixty members, including each of the presidents of the 17 school PTAs. One of the leaders of this body was spoken to. While noting that there was a national and statewide PTA policy supporting equality for all citizens, and the importance of everyone getting a quality education, she also gave her own opinions:

I'm for quality education. If quality education means integrated schools, then I am for integration. If quality education means keeping the schools separate in the old way, then I'm in favor of that. Some of the members of the PTA think it does mean integration and some think it does not. If integrated education is better education then the PTA is for it. But we are getting good education now, while it is separate. To say that the colored aren't getting equal education isn't right—they are. But they are worried about whether it will keep up.

Her attitudes toward bussing were based on the same principle. If bussing meant better education, then she was in favor of it. But it was clear that she did not feel that the evidence was all in on the question of the relationship between integration and bussing and quality education. "I'm against bussing for its own sake or integration for its own sake."

The PTA appeared to focus on the details of the educational process and to concern itself less with broader social issues. Another woman who was active in the PTA expressed this opinion: "If problems like in-service training for teachers, human relations, communication with parents, curriculum, and discipline were dealt with, then integration would take care of itself."

A number of respondents mentioned a growing concern with integration among certain members of the PTA, on the liberal side. The Citizens for the Three Rs was an indication of this trend. Another was a Community Development Group within the PTA that tried to open up communication between black and white parents. "They've been getting small groups together to talk with Negro parents and allay fears. The Negro parents have been very cooperative even though they feel it is tokenism, and that they are treated like something in a zoo." Aside from such tentative activities, the divided PTA was to take no active leadership role in the controversy.

The Chamber of Commerce

The business community also did not take an active organized role in the events that will be described, despite the fact that desegregation policy affected the future of the community and the businesses within it. Perhaps this is related to the fact that, as in Daly City, there is much absentee ownership. The major economic forces—Hollywood Park Race Track and the Forum—appeared to have a policy of steering clear of community controversy; and the traditional economic leadership somehow did not take hold of the desegregation issue.

Efforts have been made by some individuals to involve the business "establishment." In one case a man in the school administration tried to get an appointment with the owner of the Inglewood Forum for three months, but without success. He felt that stabilizing Inglewood was directly in this man's interests, since Wrigley Field in Los Angeles had deteriorated when the area surrounding it became all black. "The same thing will happen to the Forum in five years. I'm sure that the owner is just as aware of this fact as I am. I can't tell him what to do. I don't even know what he could do. But it might be useful for us to communicate."

One of the school board members reported an effort he had made to get the business leadership involved in the problem of stabilization. Since he is identified as a liberal, he acted behind the scenes through one of the members of the city council. A group of businessmen were invited to attend a meeting to discuss the future of Inglewood. The purpose of the meeting was to propose a plan that they buy a certain amount of land throughout Inglewood and then try to encourage white families to move into the community. The school board member was astonished by the response. "Some of them had never thought of these issues before." While a number of those attending promised to think about the plan, "the net effect was nothing."

A possible explanation for the noninvolvement of the downtown commercial interests was suggested by one city official. She felt that these interests would not suffer if the city became all black. At the moment many of the members of the black community do not feel that they get adequate services downtown, haircuts being one of the chief complaints. So they do much of their shopping back in the ghetto, and business has fallen off. If the town were to turn black, the whole community would use the business district again. Since many of the businesses are owned by people who do not reside in Inglewood, this would make little difference to them. (Whether such considerations have been entertained by the owners of Inglewood's commercial establishment, one cannot say.)

In general, residents described most of the business community as being unable or unwilling to get involved in the desegregation issue.

The business community is basically not aware of what is happening. They think if they close their eyes it will go away. They are willing to do some good but then they say, "But what?" They say, "We don't know where we stand on integration. We'll go along with the moral issue as long as it doesn't render us hungry." They say, "Show me how I can make a living and I'll listen to you."

Chamber of Commerce activity in the area of the schools took the form of traditional community service, through its education committee. A member of that committee said, "The Chamber is very aware of the increasing obsolescence of facilities and curriculum at the schools, and is fully in favor of extensive modernization of both."

This group was concerned with increasing the amount of cooperation between the schools and the community and in building up a greater appreciation for the schools. They set up an orientation day for incoming teachers and sponsored an awards day for teachers and students at the high school level. As shall be described in Chapter 5 the committee supported a desegregation proposal by the Citizens Advisory Committee. They clearly do not speak for the majority of the business community of Inglewood, however.

The Inglewood Teachers Association

A member of the Inglewood Teachers Association described the general feeling in that organization:

We are pretty happy with this school district. Our main concern is with salaries, and this district tries to keep

salaries and benefits at the 75th percentile. Policy-making isn't our business or our responsibility. Teachers are very busy. We work hard and have to attend a lot of meetings. We want to have some private life of our own, so we don't spend a lot of the time trying to help the board make policies. There is a very good team spirit among the teachers—a sense of esprit de corps. This is perhaps the reason why there has never been any significant AFT [American Federation of Teachers] development here.

This viewpoint was generally supported by other observers, though occasionally in a less favorable light: "The Inglewood Teachers Association will tell you that everything is hunky dorey. But the teachers show the full spectrum of opinion. Most of the teachers in Inglewood don't live in the city, and so they don't care." One of the teachers admitted to this uninvolvement: "The community gets the kind of schools they want. If the situation becomes unsatisfactory to us, we'll just leave."

As with the PTA the geographic location of teachers seemed to play an important part in their opinions. Some of the problems and concerns of teachers in the integrated schools have already been cited. West side teachers' opinions were discussed with a reporter from one of the local newspapers: "The teachers on the west side are afraid of integration and have covertly opposed integration plans. They helped to mobilize 2,000 students and their parents at two board meetings." (These were meetings at which protests were lodged against integration plans.) On the whole, however, most teachers probably were somewhat liberal, though as a school board member pointed out, "They are not going to be agents of social change."

ANTIDEGREGATION GROUPS

The Neighborhood Schools Advocates

While a number of groups that had a conservative bent on the school desegregation issue, such as home owners' associations and the like, existed, the main organization with a direct and active interest in the schools was the Neighborhood Schools Committee. During the study another group emerged—the Save Our Schools Committee (SOS). This group, however, appeared to be simply a name change rather than a change in personnel, objectives, or tactics.

The views of members of the antibussing groups tended to include a complex of interrelated values, including concern over the deterioration of integrated schools, a high evaluation of neighborhood schools, a fear of social engineering, concern over tracking (ability grouping), and an emphasis on traditional ties. These were not all of equal importance, and some were the concern of only a few individuals. Concern over school deterioration seems to be of central importance. Another core belief that will be described at some length is a basic distrust of government in general and educational "experts" in particular.

Their argument, briefly, before some quotations from respondents are presented, was that, while educators and experts argue that quality education depends on integration for both white and black children, this is patently not true in their experience. Not only had they read about trouble in integrated schools in the newspapers, but right in their own city they could see it for themselves. Consequently, they felt manipulated by the "experts" and did not trust them. The same sentiments were expressed by respondents in Robert Agger and Marshall Goldstein's study of school policy-making in two Oregon communities.⁵ Concern over neighborhood schools, bussing, tradition, etc., though values in themselves, are also indirect ways of fighting this manipulation.

Antagonism to the experts and to social engineering lies partly in their personal backgrounds. Howard Elinson found that the working-class conservatives of Bell often came from very small towns in the Midwest, where they had been very poor and had to work hard.⁶ Part of their ideology was shaped by this experience—they put a great deal of emphasis on the importance of work and of the individual's responsibility for himself. State aid to the poor is seen as corrupting. A leader of the Neighborhood Schools Committee described a similar personal history:

The Negroes in this country live better than 90 percent of the people on the face of this earth. What is it they are so upset about? I grew up practically in a frontier situation. We grew our own food and hunted for our own meat and we were perfectly satisfied. You know, there were millionaires in Montana where we lived, and we didn't resent them and what they had. If they were a good enough man to be successful then they deserve it. If I'm not, then I don't deserve it.

He was bitter in his denunciation of the "experts."

All these people come along and they just love to have problems, and they just love to come up with solutions to problems. There wouldn't be any problem in Inglewood if events were allowed to take their natural course. It is only when a very small number of radicals in Morning-side Park attempt to speed up the process that things get very serious. There are always visionaries that are asking questions like, "What does the future hold for the country?" And they always think they're going to come up with the answers. And every time they come up with the wrong answers. They'd be better off leaving it alone.

He and other respondents attributed the school administration's concern about racial matters to the influence of the federal government. "Before the superintendent went to Washington he wasn't talking about his integration. He goes back to Washington, and he starts to see dollar signs before his eyes."

It is interesting to note a parallel between the radical and liberal distrust of the police and this conservative distrust of educators. Both target groups previously relied on the legitimacy of their role, which was based on expertise. Now both are seen as pursuing special interests that are not the interests of the challenging group. In both cases there is a large element of truth in the charge.⁷ For whatever reasons many prominent educational experts are problack, and this normative perspective influences their determination of the factors that lead to quality education. This preference has not gone unnoticed.

The school board member quoted at the conclusion of Chapter also had this to say at the same meeting:

We have heard long dissertations from educators that without integration quality education is not possible. If we believe this theory we must also believe that most students will not learn in the African states because all students in the classroom have black skin. Or are we to believe that all students in Japan, because they have yellow skin and slanted eyes, they are not going to become scholars, or not able to learn as much as our students in the United States? Educators in general, it seems, take the attitude that teachers are unable to educate colored students within a group because they feel they are working with inferior products to start with . . . The city of Inglewood has been incorporated since 1908, and Inglewood High School was built shortly thereafter. The education of Inglewood students has always been considered of the highest caliber for many years, and although we have fine

administrators and many capable educators in our district, there are those newcomers in our city who seem determined to undermine this fine educational program and the city population in general . . . Are the white students, or the majority of this particular community to suffer from a lack of education, something that can never be recouped? To those disrupting few who would do damage to the education process in order to satisfy their own desires, I am reminded of a bumper sticker that says, "America, Love It or Leave It," and would suggest that something for their benefit should be printed that says, "Live with us, learn with us, or leave us."⁸

A member of the Neighborhood Schools Committee said that what educators say

about the necessity for integrated education is just pure fancy; it is pure fairy tale. I don't see why integrated education would be any better than nonintegrated education. In fact all the evidence indicates that it is worse. Where schools are integrated, they decline in the quality of the education that they provide.

Another opinion was:

Now I for one take the attitude that nearly any child can learn if properly taught by capable teachers. Educators are certainly not infallible and there are reports out that in recent years programs strongly advocated by people in education such as "progressive education" have produced students that could not read, could not write legibly or spell correctly, and as a program failed miserably.

The public rationale of these opponents of forced desegregation centered on the value they attached to the neighborhood school. "Destroying the concept of neighborhood schools would do away with much that is fine in the existing school system: the relationship between the parent, teacher and the child that the neighborhood school allows." Another put it this way:

The neighborhood school has been the most precious thing to Americans and is still so to the overwhelming majority. Many a man has bought a house distant from his own office so his youngster may be near a school he prefers. He's willing to buck traffic an hour each way rather than to

have Johnny or Suzie do that. And yet, when the heavy hand of HEW descends, his kids may have to travel as far as he does and the public be damned.

One woman, an active member of the Beulah Payne PTA, described how she had chosen her home with the closeness of the school in mind, so that her children could walk to it. She was quite firm in claiming that racial composition was not a consideration.

I went to a school with Negro children. I don't have any objections to Negroes moving into my neighborhood and attending the school. And then they would get the same treatment as anyone else. But they have the right to live where they want to. When we chose our home, we did not investigate the composition of the school. In fact, there are some Orientals and some Mexican-Americans attending. My neighborhood objects to the idea of having their children moved out to go to school. But they would be willing to accept Negro children in the neighborhood and school.

Predictably, the Neighborhood Schools advocates expressed serious concern about discipline and rumors of its breakdown in integrated schools. It is perhaps at this level that a fundamental conflict in values arises, because it is related to views about human nature. The antibussing advocates tended to be more pessimistic than the integrationists and stressed the importance of controls. When integrationists expressed concern about discipline they were more likely to suggest "softer" solutions, like in-service training for the teachers.

A fourth related value concerned the tradition of the schools. In talking about redistricting the high schools on an east-west axis, so that there would be an exchange of about half the student body between Morningside High and Inglewood High, one man responded,

If you did that, you would do away with all sense of loyalty to a school. If you were just moving back and forth from school to school, that destroys the whole sense of loyalty. I believe in loyalty—to your school and to your country. If I were playing sports, what if I were playing one week for Morningside High, next week for Inglewood High? It would destroy the whole sense of competition, the whole purpose of competition.

This argument was seen as a cover-up for opposition to integration by liberals. One woman said, "The oldest Inglewood families, living in the central district, have sentimental attachments to particular schools that they have traditionally gone to. At least that is an argument that they can use against desegregation plans." A member of PIE saw the argument as completely illogical, since when Morningside High was first built students from Inglewood High were forced to transfer.

When the man who stressed school loyalty was asked about the possibility that new loyalties could develop, once the schools were redistricted, he countered, "If they really believe in this desegregation business, what happens when they desegregate and the population changes again? Then they're going to have to make people all change schools again, and in order to live up to their guidelines, the situation would always be in flux."

There was a tendency for the antibussing advocates to see integrationists as newcomers to the community who did not appreciate these traditions. Again, there is no survey evidence to support this, but of those interviewed there did seem to be a rough correlation. Neighborhood Schools Committee members were more likely to be old-timers who had no intention of leaving Inglewood, while the integrationists (who were generally wealthier) were less tied to the community and had been there for a shorter period. Some corroboration for this view is provided by the 1969 census. Of 6,615 families who had been living in the same household from before 1960, 54 percent lived west of Prairie, 29 percent were in Morningside, and 16 percent in Imperial Village and Lockhaven.

Finally, tracking, a system of grouping students by ability levels, and taxes were also salient issues. The latter was connected with feelings about government interference. Also, since most opponents of desegregation were in the middle- and lower-middle-income brackets, they tended to be hard hit by taxes.

Their lower position on the socioeconomic ladder also relates to the concern over tracking. One woman was Inglewood's most vocal spokesman on this issue. Her children were in the lower track. She researched it thoroughly, and concluded that children in the lower track do not get the content or quality of education that those in the upper track receive. It is important to note that this value is shared by members of the black community.

The linking of a number of these values is shown in the following quotation from a conservative school board member:

A small group in our community is using pressures and threats to force this board to take action which is not in the best interests of the majority, and if this policy is

adopted certain school boundaries will be changed, and then in compliance with other board policies, which now exist, we will be required to "furnish transportation to students to school." This will only serve as a screen to bus students for purposes of integration at a terrific financial cost to the tax payers of this city. And worst of all I feel that many families, both black and white, will move from this community.

It has already been indicated, to some extent, how the integrationists viewed their opposition. For one thing, they believed that the opponents of integration fail to understand the implications of desegregation for the future demography of Inglewood. One respondent put it this way:

The community doesn't want Inglewood to go black. Neither the blacks nor the whites want this. But there is tremendous difference in feeling about how to avoid it. The conservatives are living in the late '40's and early '50's. They think the way to stabilize a community is by keeping blacks out of it. The idea of stabilizing through integration is not part of their vocabulary.

More important, the integrationists of Inglewood viewed all the public rhetoric about bussing, neighborhood schools, and so on as a smoke-screen for the real concern—educational and social integration.

There is a remarkable similarity between the organization and tactics of the Neighborhood Schools Committee/SOS and those of radical leftist groups. They were not ongoing organized groups but only coalesced periodically. Each time that school desegregation became part of the public agenda, the opponents banded together and expressed themselves with great intensity and, as will be seen, with great impact. Hundreds, sometimes thousands, of angry opponents of school desegregation would show up at school board meetings. Their attacks on their opponents and the school board were angry and sometimes vicious. Events of recent years on college campuses and elsewhere provide ample evidence that this sort of tactic can produce fear and panic in officials who must face it.

CONCLUSIONS

There were, in the positions described, some shared interests. No one in the community, pro- or antiintegrationists, whites or blacks, rich or poor, wanted to see the community go all black. There were

obvious shared concerns about quality of education, discipline, and taxes. Moreover, there were some significant convergences of interests between blacks and poor whites. Both groups tended to oppose tracking, which they thought discriminated against their children. Should the blacks begin to talk about local control, as one did at a school board meeting, when he said, "To hell with integration; give us black principals and black teachers," they would certainly find enthusiastic support within the ranks of the antiintegrationists. Yet, desegregation in Inglewood, as elsewhere, ultimately was to become a moral issue. Many of the concrete issues that have been described never became part of the public debate.

The latent conflicting interests in Inglewood became manifest during the course of the controversy. It was not inevitable that the various positions find political expression, though even in the absence of overt conflict interests such as have been described often influence individual family decisions. In Inglewood they did surface, and the purpose of this chapter is to describe and explain the political crisis that ensued.

The chapter is divided into three sections. First, the central actors in the policy-making process for the schools, the school board, and superintendent are described. Second, the history of the school desegregation controversy is traced from 1965 to 1969. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the factors that contributed to the deadlock that occurred.

THE SCHOOL BOARD AND SUPERINTENDENT

In the Inglewood Unified School District the board members are elected at-large for four-year terms. During the period of study, seven persons served on the five-man board. A number of respondents said that it was a typical and unexceptional school board for Inglewood; and according to some observers who were familiar with extra-local affairs it was a rather "average" board for the state of California.

On the one hand, there was a police lieutenant who was the head of the juvenile division of the Inglewood Police Department. He was a lifelong resident of the city who was committed to the community and disturbed by the changes that he saw developing in it. At board meetings he often expressed himself on matters of discipline and about the encroachment of the federal government into local matters.

He was an outspoken opponent of forced bussing. Despite his apparent popularity, he chose not to seek reelection in a critical election in April 1968. Another city employee, a city planner, ran in his stead, however. With the support of conservative factions in the community, he received the largest number of votes ever cast in an Inglewood school board election.

A successful Jewish attorney, who lived in the Ladera Heights area, was the member of the board with the most liberal image. He was active in statewide educational matters and was very interested in new educational approaches, such as individualized instruction. A second liberal was elected to the board in the 1969 election. A school administrator himself, in another district, he lived in Morning-side Park.

The remaining persons who served on the board during the period of the study took more equivocal positions on the desegregation issue. One was a local dentist who had been on the board for several terms. He was a very religious man who saw his position on the board as a form of community service. He, too, was a lifelong resident of Inglewood. While feeling strongly the moral imperative that the district should serve the interests of all its students, he was not certain that desegregating the schools was the best way to achieve this end. This man was the president of the board during the height of the controversy. He was defeated in the 1969 election, perhaps because he became the member of the board most clearly identified with its equivocating position.

The other incumbent who was up for reelection won. He was a local small building contractor who was also both a long-time resident of the community and a long-time member of the school board. On the board he sometimes spoke out as a fiscal conservative but generally did not engage in the debates among the more ideological board members. He expressed no interest in school desegregation and never took a clear public position on the issue.

The last of the seven was an older woman who had worked her way up to the board through community activities and who had also been a board member for many years. She did not take a clear stand on desegregation.

The superintendent of the district was appointed in 1965, at the very point in time that the desegregation issue began to surface. A man in his late fifties, he had served as business manager of the district for 12 years prior to his appointment as superintendent. Unlike younger and more mobile administrators, he probably wanted to remain in his job until retirement. Thus, while he was not personally opposed to desegregation and eventually supported a policy statement favoring it, he was very cautious.

Between 1965 and the 1969 election, then, the board had one outspoken liberal and one outspoken conservative. The other three members were moderate to conservative in their leanings. In the election, the outspoken conservative did not run but was succeeded by another man with a conservative public image. The president of the board, a moderate who was open to the idea of desegregation, though not certain it was the best solution, was defeated; and a second liberal was elected. There was no majority support for or against desegregation in either the pre- or postelection boards. Nor did the district have a strong spokesman for either position in the superintendent.

THE COURSE OF THE CONTROVERSY

The Human Relations Approach, 1965-67

By 1965 there were significant numbers of black students in the east side schools. The superintendent was quick to recognize that the school district had to begin to respond to the new conditions that were developing. The activities that he initiated, with the approval of the school board, all came under the heading of human relations. In December 1965 a Human Relations Committee composed of 15 members representative of all levels of education in the district was formed. During the following year, the committee met weekly. It published a bibliography on human relations, made a study of the district's human relations problems, and conducted a two-week summer workshop for members of the school district staff. In November 1966 the school board adopted a policy statement supporting the concept of equal educational opportunity for students of all races.

These were politically "safe" activities that did not ignite a negative community response. While pressure came from Morning-side Park Neighbors, whose leadership frequently called on the school board to move faster and take positive steps to desegregate the schools, the board and superintendent preferred a policy of moderation.

The Bureau of Intergroup Relations Report
Triggers Conflict, 1967

The board and administration were proceeding tentatively and carefully. Then, in January 1967, on the recommendation of the

Human Relations Committee, the board decided to invite the State Bureau of Intergroup Relations (BIR), an agency of the Department of Education, to conduct a study in Inglewood. It is not clear what the school leadership expected to accomplish by involving the BIR. On the one hand, the invitation came as an outgrowth of the human relations program. The BIR was, in this sense, probably perceived as an organization with expertise that could help solve racial problems in the district. At least some school leaders, then, expected that outside "objective experts" could find solutions that most of the community could live with. On the other hand, the BIR made no bones about the fact that its organizational objective was to desegregate the state's schools. The following quotation is taken from a brochure describing the organization:

Through consultation, information, and other staff services, the Bureau of Intergroup Relations assists school districts upon their request to prevent and eliminate the separation of racial and ethnic groups of pupils in California public schools. Beyond planned desegregation, the objective is to promote educational practices that bring children together and prepare them for integration in school and society.¹

The school leaders, having some sense of the depth of resistance to desegregation, should have expected trouble. Yet their subsequent behavior indicated that, if they did expect problems resulting from the BIR's activities, they did not prepare for them.

The BIR study was conducted in the months of March, April, and May by a three-man team. They investigated community attitudes about the schools as well as the school system's internal structure and operations. Contacts were made with district administrators, principals, teachers, students, representatives of public and private agencies, members of civic and school associations, and individual parents and citizens. The study team reported that many of the lay persons they contacted were suspicious about their activities and opposed to desegregation.

The tone of the meetings varied but it is probably safe to say that those PTA's not directly involved with the Lane-Freeman area expressed attitudes that were guarded, wary, and occasionally hostile. These groups often communicated the belief that "something" clandestine was being planned or had already been decided. Their concern about pupil segregation (racial imbalance) was a provincial one; that is, PTA groups west of Prairie seemed

to say that while they did not approve of segregation (on occasion, some were not quite sure that they didn't, especially if it was seen as a result of "housing patterns"), they felt that the issue had to be dealt with at the neighborhood level.²

Thus, some opponents of desegregation saw the BIR representatives as protagonists (which they were) and not as neutral observers with whom they should cooperate. To the members of Morningside Park Neighbors, on the other hand, the BIR study was the most hopeful development that had occurred in Inglewood since the emergence of race relations problems.

The BIR report was presented to the school board in July 1968. It recommended that a short-term plan to eliminate de facto segregation in the secondary schools be implemented with the beginning of the school year in September. The team suggested alternative redistricting proposals. One called for grade nine students living in the Freeman Elementary attendance area to attend Inglewood High School rather than Morningside High School upon entry into the tenth grade. The effect would have been to have a 2-percent black population at Inglewood High School and a 16.5-percent black population at Morningside High School.³ The second plan called for the redrawing of school district lines along an east-west rather than a north-south boundary, along Arbor Vitae. This would have produced a 3-percent black population at Inglewood High and a 15.5-percent black population at Morningside High.

The study team considered these to be temporary measures and proposed that the district establish a Citizens' Advisory Committee that could participate in long-range master planning for the district. The report included the outlines of several possible grade pattern changes that, the authors suggested, might in the future be employed to improve both racial and ethnic balance and quality of education in the district. The report also recommended that the district make efforts to improve community relations through such vehicles as a monthly newsletter, a community relations advisory committee, and parent information meetings.

The school board and administration found themselves confronted with a set of proposals that had the effect of concretizing a previously amorphous issue. Community organizations were aroused. The pastor at a Morningside Park church led a one-week prayer vigil and, on the evening of June 24, he and the president of the Morningside Park Neighbors appeared before the board to make a dramatic plea in favor of school desegregation. The BIR report was made available to the public the next day, and at the board meeting of July 8 a petition in favor of desegregation signed by over 200 persons was presented to

the board. Most of the public comments at the meeting were in favor of desegregation. Opponents had not yet organized for action. The board accepted the report and then asked its own district personnel to prepare a feasibility study and recommendations on the BIR proposals.

By the July 17 meeting of the board the Neighborhood Schools Committee was organized in opposition to the desegregation proposals. They circulated a petition that stated:

We, the undersigned, petition the Board of Education of Inglewood Unified School District, to retain the concept of the neighborhood school, as the most economical way to bring the largest percentage of the school budget to bear on the instructional programs and the interest of making the whole curriculum equally accessible to all students.

The opponents of desegregation were out in force at the July 17 meeting. They picketed outside the meeting room, carrying such messages as "Termites, Leave Our Board." During the meeting, angry citizens engaged in vindictive personal attacks on board members.

Several days after the meeting the most liberal member of the school board sent an open letter to the *Inglewood Daily News*. He argued that as a board member he had a legal obligation to take reasonable affirmative steps to prevent school segregation. "I intend to comply with the law, I am sure that the community expects me to do so."⁴ And later in the letter he said, "I feel that segregated schools for whatever reason are unsuitable for an enlightened community which has as one of its goals equal education and equal opportunity." The other board members remained silent publicly and awaited the feasibility report.

On August 5 the feasibility report prepared by the administration was presented. It was prefaced by the statement that "while the district does not recognize itself as an agent for social change, we are aware that de facto segregation is inconsistent with equal educational opportunity." It noted, however, that "the aspect of integrated education is one factor of many in quality programs of instruction. The district is now engaged in providing such a program to all students. It should not pursue any plan to adjust racial imbalance that would necessitate a reduction of these high standards." The report concluded that redistricting of junior and senior high school areas in the next school year was not feasible.

Any temporary improvement in racial balance provided by them (the plans for desegregation) for the secondary

schools is outweighed by the concerns of: (a) the paradox of assigning students to schools that are already in greater need of more facilities than the schools they now attend; (b) the financial impact for buildings and equipment required to project the plan; (c) a lack of adequate time for public involvement.⁵

The school district data, as opposed to the study-team data, indicated that the proposed desegregation plans would produce overcrowding.

On August 12 the board unanimously adopted the feasibility report. The board president noted that "the entire proceedings were marked by an incredible lack of understanding and ignorance."⁶ He exhorted the community to pull together.

In fact, the board's handling of the BIR report was to have just the opposite result. There was a general feeling in the community that the superintendent and board had weaseled out of a decision on technical grounds. Neither the proponents of desegregation or their antagonists felt that the board could be trusted. A member of the BIR study team pointed out what was apparent to many observers:

Their figures may be right, but they never explained how they determined them. But in terms of feasibility, there are all sorts of plans they could come up with . . . If our figures are really wrong and the schools would be overcrowded under our plan, they could just move the boundary line that we suggested a couple of blocks away.

The integrationists were terribly disillusioned, and some began to make plans to institute a court suit against the district. The Neighborhood Schools Committee members remained distrustful and continued to watch carefully the activities of the board. In the community at large there was a feeling that the school board had been discredited. The issue was unresolved. Battle lines were drawn. The district was in for another difficult year.

The Citizens Advisory Committee Produces A Second Desegregation Crisis, 1968-69

The feasibility report recommended the acceptance of all the other BIR proposals. In fact, on more than one occasion at school board meetings the superintendent emphasized that the BIR report had not been rejected. Only one of its many proposals had been rejected. The most important of the proposals that was accepted by the board was the one calling for the creation of a Citizens Advisory

Committee that would engage in wide-ranging master planning. The implementation of the proposal began with the appointment of a full-time master planning consultant at the beginning of the 1968-69 school year. The appointee had been vice-principal at Morningside High for many years, and his selection served a dual purpose. The board also appointed as the new principal at Morningside a man who had been a successful principal at a predominantly black school in Compton. Giving the man who was in line for the job the master planning position was a way of softening the blow of his rejection. He was a good appointment because he was one of the most respected and well-liked administrators in the district. At the same time, the board also appointed a Human Relations Coordinator. He was a black man with previous experience as a high school teacher and in the human relations field.

As the school year began, it appeared that school district activities had returned to normal. At the October 14 meeting the superintendent and his cabinet made individual presentations on district priorities. No mention was made of desegregation, and the issue remained relatively quiet until December. Early in December, however, the superintendent was informed that a law suit was being filed against the district for a court order to desegregate the schools. At the December 16 board meeting he announced that the planning of a Citizens Advisory Committee was under way, that the Human Relations Committee was being reorganized, and that both in-service training for teachers and an integrated summer school were being planned.

At the first school board meeting of 1969 a spokesman for a group of black parents, calling themselves Parents Interested in Education (PIE), presented a list of demands to the school board. They called for hiring black teachers, coaches, clerks, counselors, and administrators; sensitivity programs for teachers; classes in black history and culture and Mexican-American studies; celebration of Brotherhood Week, National Negro History Week, and Cinco de Mayo; the heterogeneous grouping of elementary and secondary levels and the elimination of tracking; and the establishment of a structure in the secondary schools that would afford a forum so that black students might air their grievances. Most important, they strongly supported desegregation.

The next significant development occurred in late January when the member of the school board who had most consistently opposed efforts to desegregate the schools announced that he would not seek another term in office. The tone of his remarks was bitter. He blamed unnamed sources for indicating a severe lack of confidence in his judgment and making accusations regarding a conflict of interest over his role as a juvenile officer in the Inglewood Police

Department. Other board members were stunned but immediately took pains to compliment him for his work on the board.

The Adoption of a Policy Statement

Clearly, the issue of desegregation was not going to disappear. The district now had to face up to pressures from black parents and to a law suit. The superintendent decided that the time had come for him to take a stand. He presented to the school board a draft of a policy statement favoring desegregation. To strengthen his position he had all the other top administrators in the district endorse the statement, which included the following:

The board recognizes that the term "equal educational opportunity" implies the opportunity for each individual to become aware of and to understand and appreciate the many varieties of culture, to learn to relate positively to the diverse people in this society, to contribute and refine his own evolving cultural patterns, and to develop his own dignity and worth. Therefore, we realize that racial/ethnic segregation poses a challenge to equality of educational opportunity and that this challenge must be met with a full thrust of our legal authority and moral leadership.⁷

The statement concluded:

The board of education now reaffirms its determination to use whatever means are in keeping with sound educational policy to retard the growth of racial/ethnic segregation and to use all reasonable means to reduce racial/ethnic segregation in the schools of the district.

The policy statement was presented to the school board on February 5. At the same meeting the superintendent also submitted a plan for an integrated summer school program. Shortly after the meeting and before the board was to accept or reject the policy statement on February 24, the superintendent was interviewed. He said that, in taking a stand and openly declaring themselves in favor of integration, the administrators were challenging the board and community.

The board now had to choose between adopting the policy statement or ignoring the law suit and rejecting the stand of the administrators, thereby indicating a lack of confidence in them. They adopted the policy statement by a vote of four to one.

The Development of a New Desegregation Plan

Meanwhile, the Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) began to take shape. In authorizing its formation the school board stipulated that its membership should reflect a racial, social, business, and educational cross-section of the city. A membership of about 120 was projected, although eventually there were 176 members; about 150 was an average attendance at their weekly meetings. The first meeting was held on January 30. Since a report was expected by early May, the CAC had only three months in which to complete its work.

The administration wanted the CAC to engage in long-range master planning. The master planning consultant said, "We want people to let their imaginations run wild." The early general meetings introduced the lay group to new ideas in education, such as innovations in instructional and school design. The superintendent made a speech to the group in early February in which he proposed a new high rise "tower of learning" that would incorporate the most modern educational equipment and techniques. He commented in an interview that such a plan was economically feasible and would put Inglewood in the forefront of California's school districts.

On February 13 the CAC members were asked to divide into small discussion groups and consider the matter of district priorities. Out of the group discussions came five issues for immediate consideration. In order of priority they were integration, curriculum, facilities, quality education, and student-teacher involvement.

With that decision school desegregation became the top priority item for the CAC. The school district staff made a presentation on the problem on February 27 that highlighted the school district's responsibility to take some positive steps in the direction of desegregation or face action by the courts. The discussion groups, which met after the presentation, reported a sense of urgency among most of them in regard to the need to take positive action to desegregate the schools. The report of one group said:

There was a general feeling of irritation against the filing of the lawsuit, but it was realized that the lawsuit resulted from the inertia of the school board. The problem of integration is not only that of the schools but of the entire city—if the whites move, the quality of city life will diminish.

That quickly, the administration lost control of the direction of the CAC. Instead of desegregation falling within the context of long-range master planning that would consider many elements and types

of change in the district, as the administration had planned, the CAC began to focus upon specific desegregation plans. The opponents of desegregation either kept quiet or withdrew from the CAC. The school board, meanwhile, appeared to take no active interest in these developments.

Nearly 200 persons attended the CAC meeting of March 6. The emphasis was upon discussion of various methods of desegregation. The discussions continued at the meeting of March 13. The various groups began to place more emphasis upon grade pattern changes of one sort or another. Some groups began to have an interest in the 6-3-3 grade pattern change plan that had been included in the BIR proposals. At the March 20 meeting the redistricting plans of the BIR were compared with grade pattern changes. The consensus was that redistricting would not provide a sound, long-range solution.

The 6-3-3 grade pattern change that emerged as the preferred alternative was essentially a pairing plan for the secondary schools. One junior-senior high school complex would be turned into a high school facility, while the other junior-senior high school complex would be turned into a junior high school facility. In that way all senior high school students would attend one school, as would all junior high school children. The elementary schools would not be changed. On April 10 the CAC adopted a motion directing the superintendent to provide information on the feasibility of a 6-3-3 plan.

The superintendent did not like the 6-3-3 plan. His report indicated that implementation of the plan would put a strain upon facilities and require disruptive and unnecessary transfers of teachers and students. He reported that the new facilities that would be required for implementation of the plan would cost between \$275,000 and \$315,000. Instead, he proposed a new redistricting plan that, he argued, would provide the best and cheapest short-term solution to desegregation. Only two new buses would be required for the small amount of bussing called for in the plan. His summary statement suggested that immediate implementation of the 6-3-3 plan would be too precipitous.

I wish to further identify that I'm not rejecting the idea of the 6-3-3 organization plan as an important factor in the long-range Master Plan which hopefully will be completed within the next five years . . . This Master Plan must be designed to accept a re-organization plan, but to attempt it at this time is unfeasible. We cannot match a program to existing facilities but we would prefer to build the facilities to incorporate the plan. To this end, I'm going to recommend to the Board of Education in June that we retain the services of an

outstanding survey team to survey and analyze our district and recommend to us the best course to follow in submitting a long-range plan.⁸

The superintendent thus not only rejected the CAC policy proposal but also indicated that he would find a better way to engage in master planning. The CAC was angered. Its leaders immediately directed the superintendent to "report specifically on any 6-3-3 plan that will work by 1969 or as soon as is feasible." The superintendent acquiesced. On April 24 a new report was presented to the CAC. In the introduction the superintendent set the theme that was to be used in an effort to sell the 6-3-3 plan to the school board and to the community. He said, "The most important benefit will be consolidation of facilities for upgrading the quality of education. The plan also, incidentally, eliminates racial imbalance."⁹

The report proceeded with a thorough examination of how to make a 6-3-3 plan work. It proposed one junior high school at the Inglewood-Crozier complex and one senior high school at the Morning-side-Monroe complex. A detailed explanation of the changes that would have to be made in terms of facilities, teachers, and so on was provided.

The report outlined three methods by which the plan would be financed: by levying a special tax authorized and not previously used; by selling district land, the proceeds of which could be used only for buildings and equipment of a permanent nature; and by using a portion of the remaining estimated balance of the 1969-70 operating budget. The report failed to note that the district was authorized by state law to have a bonded indebtedness of up to \$12,000,000 and that none of this potential had been utilized. The 6-3-3 plan would have cost \$434,062 if relocatable facilities were to have been used and \$639,226 if permanent facilities were constructed. The CAC voted 118 to 56 in favor of the 6-3-3 plan, although not specifying in its report which cost program it favored. The presentation of the 6-3-3 plan to the school board was planned for the April 28 board meeting.

The School Board Election

While all of this was going on the lawsuit that had been filed on February 6 was continued until May 28, allowing for the CAC to make its recommendations and for the results of the April school board election. The first major task of the new school board would be to deal with the 6-3-3 proposal.

The election indicated public involvement had increased in educational issues, with a record 45-percent voter turnout, but the results were ambiguous. Three seats were being contested, those

of two incumbents up for reelection and the seat of the conservative who had resigned. The incumbents hardly campaigned. Inglewood Neighbors, although not able to campaign as an organization for any candidate, did have a candidate who represented their views. Likewise, the proponents of the Neighborhood Schools Committee strongly favored the election of the city planning director, a man with a conservative public image. On election day he received 8,658 votes, a new record. One incumbent, the more conservative of the two up for reelection, came in second with 8,419 votes. The liberal candidate came in third with 7,800 votes, and the second incumbent was thus defeated. While the board now had an additional liberal, the conservative-to-moderate majority was retained.¹⁰

The New Board Faces Immediate Crisis

The 6-3-3 plan was presented to the new board at the meeting of April 28. Close to 3,000 persons showed up at the Inglewood High School auditorium, which had been set up as a special meeting site due to the anticipated large turnout. Even the auditorium was too small, however. People were sitting and standing in the aisles. The Fire Department was called to decide whether or not such a large crowd should meet in the auditorium, and everyone waited around for 30 minutes for someone from the Fire Department to arrive. Then, an announcement was made that the Fire Department did feel that the meeting could not continue in the auditorium. Sound facilities were set up hastily in the gymnasium. Finally, an hour or more after the meeting had been called, it began. The delay added fuel to the already overheated atmosphere.

Immediately it became clear that the opponents of the 6-3-3 plan were out in force. A new organization, the Save Our Schools Committee (SOS), distributed leaflets. The CAC chairman gave his report, recommending implementation of the 6-3-3 plan by September 1969. The president of the board announced that the board intended to devote the remainder of the meeting to comments from interested citizens. The meeting continued until after midnight; and of the over 80 statements made to the board, only about 10 were favorable. Critics argued that the CAC was an unrepresentative body, that the traditions of Inglewood High School would be destroyed (students of that school were quite vocal on that point), that the plan would cost too much money, and that it was not feasible. Others said it was just an expensive plan to desegregate the schools.

The following week members of the CAC went out to all 18 schools of the district to talk to the parents about the 6-3-3 plan. Their theme was that the 6-3-3 plan would stimulate the quality of

education. They tried to play down desegregation. The CAC spokesmen were not well received. The authors attended one meeting at the Centinela Elementary School, on the west side, that was probably typical. Approximately 70 people attended the meeting, which was conducted by three CAC members who lived in the area. Initial remarks centered on the quality of education that the 6-3-3 plan would produce and indicated that desegregation was an incidental concern. The question-and-answer period that followed made it quite clear that the community was concerned with desegregation. Few questions were asked about quality education and even these had racial overtones. The vast majority of questions were about desegregation. "Why does the 6-3-3 plan have to be tied in with desegregation?" "Why was desegregation the first thing that the CAC considered?" When bussing and discipline were being discussed, people stood up and shouted at the CAC members.

The next board meeting was held in the gymnasium at Morning-side High School. All of the pressures that had been building in the community for years seemed to focus upon that evening. Both pro- and antiintegrationist groups were represented by hundreds of persons. It had come down to the point where one side was going to win and the other was going to lose.

The school board, however, quickly and unanimously voted to hold a private study session to consider all aspects of the plan before taking a final vote. The audience, which was keyed for a decision, exploded in anger and frustration at the board's failure to resolve the issue. Hearing person after person, most of them opposed to desegregation, attack them must have been a terribly trying experience for the board members. Finally, one of the long-time members of the board could stand it no longer. He said, "I don't see any reason why the board has to stand for this sort of thing." He argued that the 6-3-3 plan wasn't economically feasible, anyway; and he made a motion that the plan be tabled indefinitely. The motion was seconded by the newly elected conservative. One of the middle-of-the-road board members was absent that evening, which left an apparent 2-2 vote on the motion, since the two other members were ostensibly prodesegregation and had already voted in favor of a study session.

Then something quite surprising occurred. One of the pro-desegregationists, a man who the year before had written a letter to the paper in which he proclaimed his duty to vote for desegregation, announced that if two other persons voted in favor of the motion, he would support it as well. He said he would do so in order to maintain unity on the Board. His announcement immediately killed the 6-3-3 plan.

On May 28 the superior court judge hearing the desegregation suit against the Inglewood School District dismissed the case. He

maintained jurisdiction, however, and warned the school board that if steps were not taken to correct racial imbalance by September 1970 he would reverse his decision.

ANALYSIS

The failure of the Inglewood school board may have been a product of the variables emphasized by Crain and Stout: a board whose members, because they are elected rather than appointed, disagree in terms of their personal orientations toward desegregation; the opening up of the decision to community discussion by inviting in the BIR, and later appointing a Citizens Advisory Committee; and the absence of a strong economic elite that could have provided real political support for such a decision. These factors were all present in Inglewood, and in this sense the Crain/Stout model fits the case. Nevertheless, the events in this suburban community can be interpreted in somewhat different terms. It is for the reader to decide which interpretation he finds more reasonable.

Traditional Decision-Making Style

Before black families began to move into Inglewood the school board had developed a style of decision-making that set the tone for how it was to deal with conflict. This style, which is probably typical of many boards around the country, can be characterized as consensual and apolitical. By this it is meant that there was an absence of any kind of bargaining either overtly or behind the scenes among school officials themselves or between board members and representatives of community interest groups. Nor did each board member even tacitly represent a particular constituency.

The superintendent described his version of this style:

I don't meet socially with the board members because I don't want to mix business with friendship, and then have to deal with the problem of going against my friends. My policy in dealing with the board is to give them a statement. They can vote it down or they can accept it, but I will never discuss it with them beforehand.

A board member said:

I never meet socially with any of the school board members, though I do meet with the superintendent once in

a while. I've thought of having lunch with the human relations coordinator, but I don't want to contaminate him with my image. If I had lunch with him, everybody would think I had coopted him. There is very little communication among school board members, at least on my part, at any time other than when we meet formally as a board.

While he did not appear to disapprove of this mode of operations, he did notice some problems:

The school board doesn't have a good working relationship with the superintendent and administration. I'm the only one who gets together with the superintendent to discuss school or policy matters. When they have a criticism of the administration, instead of talking with the superintendent and trying to work it out privately, other members will provoke the matter in public, and seem to enjoy scoring on the superintendent. I think it is very important to maintain the prestige of the school superintendent. There is no point in putting him on the hot seat before the public.

There are three basic reasons for this apolitical stance. First, school boards in California are constrained from engaging in informal communication by a California law called the Brown Act, which makes behind-the-scenes substantive communication illegal. Second, the board and superintendent felt that informal communication was morally reprehensible, a view of politics that is quite common in this country. Third, and perhaps most important, an apolitical style was appropriate to the kind of community Inglewood was before the black in-migration. The community was then homogeneous in composition and more or less unified in goals. Board members were "typical" community members who simply reflected essential community consensus. In order to represent the interests of the community adequately, the members of the board needed to decide only what they felt was best for it. Extensive consultation with community groups or behind-the-scenes negotiations were unnecessary. The board, acting like a kind of board of directors, could set broad policy in line with the community consensus, and the administration was left to implement this policy and operate the schools on a day-to-day basis.

In practice, then, the board had little difficulty in arriving at unanimous decisions. The vast majority of issues put before it were routine and/or technical in nature. They did not have to meet very often or give much attention to other than the technicalities of school matters between meetings. Most citizens did not take an

active interest in the schools as long as they continued to operate fairly smoothly. Board elections attracted as little as one-fourth to one-third of the eligible voters.

The Traditional Approach Applied to the Desegregation Issue

Desegregation presented the board with a qualitatively different problem. It inevitably produced real and serious internal divisions in the community. As these divisions led to participation, the school leadership, wedded as it was to the traditional apolitical approach, was ineffective. The traditional approach hampered the board in several ways.

First, the board was faced with making a decision in the absence of adequate knowledge about the positions of various interest groups in the city. Stout and Sroufe assert that such knowledge is unattainable, since there is no way the board could check out the true representativeness of an organization.¹¹ While this may be so, it is true for all political organizations and interest groups and is not a special feature of suburban communities. Who is to say, for example, the degree to which a labor union speaks for its membership?

The mechanisms for communicating with community groups had not been developed in Inglewood, and the board was not able to create them quickly enough to get these inputs. While this "blindness" should have permitted the board to take bold action, it had the opposite effect. Acting in the dark made board members fearful of possible community response. The school board and administration anticipated powerful negative reactions to any actions they might take. Had they communicated with community groups this anticipation might have been tempered. As it was, it helped to immobilize the board.

A second effect was that, by not taking leadership in trying to work out compromises between competing interests, the board pushed community groups into taking direct political action on their own. This made the discussion much more heated and also exposed the board to pressure by politicizing and polarizing groups. Instead of taking the initiative in establishing communication with representatives of various interests, the board became the recipient of threats.

Community groups expressed dissatisfaction with the apolitical conduct of the board, though they did not necessarily use these terms. They were more likely to complain about inadequate communication with the board or superintendent and about neglect of their point of view. A member of Inglewood Neighbors, for example, pointed out that

The superintendent resents the involvement of housewives in the business of the school district on the grounds that he and other professionals are qualified to deal with the problems of the district, which cannot be understood by lay people, who are now trying to involve themselves in school activities.

To combat this interest groups developed their own strategies for having their point of view heard. The president of Inglewood Neighbors reported:

We always send a representative to school board meetings and, in fact, to every significant meeting in the community about the schools. We used to try to make public statements after the meeting to present our position or to argue a point, but we discovered that our opposition would use the board meetings as a platform also, to retaliate and answer our points. So we've stopped using board meetings this way.

Another effort by this group to bring about a more political approach was to advocate a change in the method of electing school board members. They pushed for district elections to replace the existing system. Clearly, such a change would have made the board more of a broker for competing community interests.

The political tactics of the Neighborhood Schools Committee activists were ultimately even more troublesome to the board. They subjected the board to overwhelming mass pressure during critical periods of decision. The tactic was the same as that employed by minority group and student activists in the late 1960s.

Since the school board members did not discuss tactics among themselves, they were almost helpless before these competing pressures. Their behavior indicated that they had no notion that they should plan the pace of events in terms of their political consequences. The board members' substantive communication among themselves and with the community never went beyond public posturing. The result was confusion and indecision, contributing to a public image of weakness. The longer the board vacillated, the more polarized the community became; and as the board lost prestige in the community because of its inability to act the prospects of its being able to find an answer that would meet the minimal concerns of competing groups became less and less sanguine.

Political Efforts

The two efforts to take constructive steps failed. Bringing in the BIR was an effort to disclose community feelings as well as an attempt at influence. The CAC was a more comprehensive effort to engage interest groups in a process of resolving their differences in an orderly manner.

In the case of the BIR, the study team aroused opposition by clearly representing the point of view of one party to the conflict. They became advocates of the position of Inglewood Neighbors. Their efforts to hear all sides were not convincing. Instead, they generated cynicism and anger. The BIR report devotes the bulk of its pages to arguments and statements favoring desegregation as a principle, statements written long before the group studied Inglewood's problems. A moderate leader of the PTA council said this about the BIR: "Well, they were experts and they looked into the whole picture. But making a report and living with the situation are totally different. They might be more objective, but they don't know what it is like to live in the situation." The CAC was a more serious effort to involve the public. Yet, in its conception and design there was confusion as to its basic purpose. The superintendent and his staff member in charge of master planning spoke about long-range master planning as being the basic objective of the CAC. The superintendent, in fact, had a personal conception of the direction that future development of the district should take and he saw the CAC as "an army of 200 people, leaders in the community, who will go out and speak to the community and sell them on my idea." On the other hand, he also wanted the CAC to be a forum for the open airing of ideas. "I want the members of the CAC to thrash through their differences, the difficulties and the advantages and disadvantages of each of the possibilities, and then find some kind of solution."

The CAC accomplished neither objective. The short-term desegregation proposal that it produced did not have the support of the superintendent. The board did not participate in its activities and was not committed to its recommendations. Thus, there was not a cohesive mobilization of community leadership in favor of a solution. Certainly, opposing points of view were not aired. As the dominant thrust of CAC activity became clear, opposing forces withdrew, and the CAC members were in fact far less sensitive to potential opposition than the school board, superintendent, or BIR. Additionally, the CAC was too pressed for time and too large and unwieldy. The school board members kept their distance and did not use the CAC as a mechanism for communicating with the community or negotiating with its leadership. A divided leadership fell easy prey to the radical leadership of the Neighborhood Schools Committee activists.

Stout and Sroufe would agree with the findings that the tradition of school governance makes school leaders poorly suited to manage conflicts. They conclude that the best strategy is to avoid them by taking preemptive action. Since the authors of this volume are skeptical about the ultimate effects of preemptive action under demographic conditions such as those that exist in Inglewood, it is felt here that it is necessary to try to make politics work better. Although there are risks involved, school boards that must deal with school desegregation should do so in a forthrightly political manner. It is possible that an effective political decision-making process could produce better long-term results.

The analysis has shown the complexity of the political problem faced by the school leadership of Inglewood. The demographic pressures were profound and were shaped fundamentally by the fact that most people were free to move out. This quality of the situation created pressures toward an outcome that no one wished to see: the alteration of Inglewood into an extension of the black ghetto (and the perpetuation of a segregated society).

The freedom to leave encourages a high degree of rancor. People are able to take hard-line positions, saying in effect: "If you don't satisfy me, I will move out." They can take nonnegotiable stands because they are not ultimately dependent on a negotiated settlement. In fact, such a stance was taken by both sides in Inglewood. Yet an increase in the level of rancor and animosity is likely to speed up the process of exodus even more. People need not tolerate conflict itself, let alone a resolution that does not satisfy them completely. There is a negative spiral of hardening positions, increasing hostility, and polarization, pushing toward an exodus of white and black middle class families from Inglewood. This process is exacerbated by the fact that each individual decision to move out increases the pressures on the remaining residents to move.

When looked at in this way, the problem of school desegregation takes on metropolitanwide significance.¹ People may relocate from community to community within the same metropolitan area without affecting their job and other important social relations. Relocation outside of the metropolitan area is another matter. Since individuals are more tied to the larger territory, they will be more willing (or forced) to tolerate some of the short-term costs of change. In short, they have a stake in the metropolitan area that they do not have in a particular suburban community.

Forces that affect the whole area (such as the expansion of black residence westward in Los Angeles) but that are the separate political responsibility of each community are perhaps uncontrollable. If black families moved all over the Los Angeles basin, then the pressures on Inglewood would dissipate. But because the problem is not treated on a metropolitan basis, the predominantly white communities adjacent to Inglewood are able to say: "That's your problem, and we're not interested in its implications for ourselves."

Unfortunately, there is presently in the United States neither the desire nor the capacity to manage racial problems on a metropolitan scale. Therefore, one must contemplate alternative strategies and choices within the context of Inglewood, even while recognizing the limited ability of the people of Inglewood to "control" the destiny of the community. This is done, not because at this point in time it makes a difference in Inglewood but because it may shed light on problems of community conflict in other places.

Once one opens up speculation on "how things might have been different," it is obvious that there are a large number of variables, any of which, if altered, would have produced somewhat different results. To be useful, the discussion must be narrowed to variables that could have been changed by purposive action. For this reason, this search for alternatives will focus upon the activities of the school leadership. Unlike other purposive actors or groups in Inglewood who are essentially free to "play to win," the school board and administration have the formal responsibility to decide for the whole community.

STRATEGIC CHOICES

There are three broad strategies that the school board could have followed. The first is to have continued in the traditional way as if the community had not changed dramatically. The strategy involves assuming that there is still a basic consensus in the community and that it is unnecessary to develop a clear picture of community demands. This is the alternative that the school board naturally fell into. At the community level, avoidance of the issues historically has proven to be remarkably successful.² Often there are powerful community norms that lead people to ignore potentially divisive issues. Effective sanctions can be employed to silence "troublemakers." In Inglewood, as was indicated, this strategy proved inappropriate. The minimal satisfaction of community members that is necessary to maintain their noninvolvement could not be achieved by avoidance of the issue, and participation was forced on the board. Participation occurred within the context of traditional consensual decision-making

norms, however, and led to indecision on the part of the board and a decline in their authority with all segments of the community.

A second alternative would have been to take strong preemptive action, perhaps with the enlisted support of community influentials. The board could then have made a decision to solve the community's problems one way or another. This might indeed have been an effective short-term strategy; and had the decision been one that most community members could have lived with it even might have been effective in the long term. It is most doubtful that in Inglewood a preemptive decision to desegregate the schools, without taking into account other interests in the community, would have produced more than a fleeting period of desegregation, followed by a rapid exodus of dissatisfied whites.

It is an anomaly that preemption is generally favored by liberals. Although liberals are often maligned for valuing decision processes more than outcomes, in the area of school desegregation they are quite willing to forego open decision processes. If desegregation ultimately fails, their possible victory may be both short-lived and costly. Blocking participation may have a number of negative effects. One may wonder, for instance, whether preemption will not be the prime counterstrategy of the opponents to desegregation, if and when they gain control of the board.

At a more general level preemptive decision-making can produce profound alienation with potentially serious consequences not only locally but also on a national scale. Robert Agger and Marshall Goldstein investigate innovations in educational technology in two Oregon communities. They find that the educational professionals are insensitive to the needs of citizens who fall into what Agger and Goldstein call the "lower social classes," both white and ethnic minorities. These insensitivities lead to alienation that then finds expression in "an increasing tendency for citizens of lower cultural classes to express their anxieties and discontents by voting against the school budget, a school bond issue, an urban renewal program, or fluoridation."³ Agger and Goldstein conclude that decision-making systems must be open to all segments of communities even though "acquiescence to the voice of the people today seems to mean reaction rather than forward looking reform."⁴

The paradox posed by Inglewood is that most of the people of the community did not want to see it become an extension of the ghetto; more specifically they did not want to have to move away. Many undoubtedly would have been happiest with an Inglewood much like it was ten years ago, a completely white community. But apart from a few hard-core racists who could not tolerate a single black family in their neighborhood or school, the majority of Inglewood's residents would have been willing to live in an integrated community. For some

of the reasons suggested, however, stabilizing the population at an intermediate proportion of blacks and whites is a very elusive goal. Communities seem able to stabilize for a time with all-white populations. When under the kinds of demographic pressures faced by Inglewood, however, it is very difficult to stabilize with both black and white families. This was amply demonstrated for all Inglewood residents by the failure of Morningside Park, despite the great efforts of Inglewood Neighbors to keep the area integrated.

These dynamics create a particularly difficult political problem. Those who are dissatisfied by political decision or indecision can, unless encumbered, move out. Each family that leaves, whether they are integrationists, neighborhood schools advocates, or moderates, contributes to an outcome desired by no one. Thus, a one-sided victory won't work and compromises are essential.

It is for these reasons that a third strategy for school leadership to try is here proposed: the development of more effective mechanisms of participation. First, it is not anticipated that a participatory strategy would produce a clear decision to desegregate the schools, given the opposition that would have the opportunity to surface. In the Inglewood situation, however, there does seem to be some potential bases for agreement that will be spelled out shortly. Assuming that the mechanisms to be outlined could have enabled the parties to work toward certain agreements, there is some possibility, of what magnitude one cannot estimate, that political action could have stemmed the tide of demographic change.

PARTICIPATORY DECISION-MAKING

The approach advocated here is drawn in very general outlines. It is presented tentatively, in a spirit of humility; no one possesses all the answers.

A fundamental first step in a more effective participatory strategy would be for the leadership to recognize the reality of the conflict. This perspective would, in many instances, run counter to basic feelings about themselves and their community. It is likely to come as people reluctantly respond to the force of events impinging upon them and would thus occur unevenly throughout a community. In Inglewood, for instance, the two school board members newly elected in 1969 were more willing to accept conflict than were the long-time members of the board. As more communities experience conflict, the diffusion of new orientations will proceed more rapidly.

Once leadership recognized the existence of conflict, they could begin to adopt procedures for managing it. The traditional role of authoritative decision-maker with individual responsibility to make

judgments for the community would have to be modified to incorporate additional responsibility to serve as mediators of conflict. Leadership would become the focal point for the interplay of conflicting interests.

Leadership should recognize that all groups in the community have a legitimate point of view; one that has a right to be heard. No group's position should be disregarded as "irrational bigotry" or "wild-eyed idealism." In other words, school leadership should try to avoid accepting the rhetoric of one of the groups. It should try to maintain a more neutral role, listening carefully to all interests.

There is a tendency in conflict situations for people or groups to view all their objectives as being linked together. These linked goals are frequently attached to a symbol, such as the word "bussing." When interests are lumped together in this way, compromise is impossible. Since a group only has one apparent objective, that objective must be achieved or the group will have failed. Positions become nonnegotiable, and the debate is likely to be emotional and rancorous.

The board should encourage all interest groups to break down their general goals into more concrete and particular objectives. "Bussing," for example, includes such objectives as avoiding lengthy transportation, maintaining the advantages of neighborhood schools (which could also be specified), avoiding all the specific costs of desegregation, and so on. When such specific objectives are laid out, it may then become apparent that they are not inevitably linked together. Some objectives might be attainable despite lack of complete satisfaction on others. Some objectives may be found to be of more central concern than others, the latter being points for possible negotiation and compromise. And finally, different groups may find that not all their objectives are in opposition to one another, that some of their goals are shared. In sum, it is here suggested that the school leadership should try to encourage the movement from a polarized to a pluralized structure of interests.⁵

Simultaneously, the leadership should encourage the manifest expression of these pluralistic interests. Payoffs and interests should be made explicit. Global ideologies should be set aside so that all parties could be free to explore the question: "What's in it for me?" It is only at this level that compromise could be achieved.

By compromise is meant that the parties to conflict do not alter their preferences. They retain different optimum positions but are willing to settle for something less than their ideal.⁶ They are willing to do so because a settlement is preferable to no settlement. For some Inglewood residents, any settlement short of their optimum position was more undesirable than having to relocate; for many others it was not. But the longer the issue remained unresolved the more intransigent people became. The potential for compromise changed as conditions changed.

It may be noted that compromise has a negative connotation. It implies "lack of principle," unwillingness to stand behind what is true and right. Politicians are often condemned for bargaining and making deals, activities that are aimed at arriving at bargains. Yet clearly, in order to be able to live together peacefully, people must often be willing to settle for an arrangement that does not entirely suit them.

For the most part compromises in Inglewood could not have been the sort commonly associated with legislative bargaining. Side payments or logrolling is fundamental to normal legislative bargaining. A legislator will trade his vote on someone else's proposal in exchange for that person's support of his own proposal. In a school desegregation controversy there are few, if any, side payments available. It is a one-shot issue and there are no other issues of comparable importance to the community. Some minor bargains might be struck up, however. Antidesegregation groups might be more willing to see limited forms of desegregation if they could receive some assurance that serious steps would be taken to control problems of discipline, for example. On the whole one would expect that compromise in this issue would primarily involve the search for commonalities of interest and the willingness to set aside positions that obviously are not shared.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to work out compromises in public. Therefore it is essential for a leadership to develop informal channels of communication. Both international and domestic negotiations provide ample evidence that conflicting parties "bend" more in private negotiations than in public speeches.

Effective communication is also more likely to occur early in a controversy rather than later on. As Kenneth Boulding says,

One of the biggest problems in developing the institutions of conflict control is that of catching conflict young. Conflict situations are frequently allowed to develop to almost unmanageable proportions before anything is done about them, by which time it is often too late to resolve them by peaceable and procedural means.⁷

Part of the leadership's procedural strategy should be quick intervention. They might begin to make progress if they can find some program for which they could get general community support and involvement.

It is recognized that there are powerful forces that can and do prevent effective communication. It is difficult for small groups of people to develop understanding among themselves, let alone among a community of 95,000 people. In a large community secondary communication, in which some people get second-, third-, and fourth-hand versions of what is actually said, can lead to distortion and confusion.

Moreover, people may as a matter of personal or group strategy purposefully avoid expressing their own interests or recognizing others. It was found that many people in Inglewood did have a pretty good sense of what was at stake for themselves and others. Politically, they could not express their true views in public and there were no private channels of communication through which such interchanges could occur. A full airing of views undoubtedly would be difficult and painful but no more so than the unremitting conflict that prevailed in Inglewood. Out of such a process there might also develop a greater sense of shared concern about the community as a whole among a larger number of people.

In order to induce the various factions to participate in communication, it is suggested that in a case such as Inglewood the board make very explicit the joint problem that all residents share: that the community will become an extension of the black ghetto if they do not do something about it quickly. It is this overriding common interest that can provide a framework within which compromises may be thrashed out. It must be pointed out to the community that every element must achieve some minimal degree of satisfaction in whatever plan the community comes up with or they will feel pressured into moving out, thereby speeding up the population turnover and hastening a negative outcome for all. School leadership should try to make this point clear and encourage communication within this framework of collective interest.

From time to time the press reports isolated instances of communities pulling together in this way. At Hamilton High School, a school within the Los Angeles City School District, which is at a stage that is similar to Morningside High during the period of this study, a group of parents have joined to petition the school board to enforce a ban on transfers, both of black students in and white students out of the school. The leaders of the parents' group indicated that they felt that they had to take a stand against the process of resegregation.⁸

The Nation's Schools magazine reports an earlier instance in which the same strategy succeeded.

The results of this three years old experiment are startling. The percentage of Negro children enrolled in the school not only has stopped accelerating, it has declined. White parents who had withdrawn their children put them back into Pasture. Children attending private schools have come back to the public school. Now white families are moving into the neighborhood because of the schools' outstanding academic reputation. The percentage of Negroes to whites in the lower grades is close to the 50-50

mark. Both Negro and white parents like the change and participate actively in the school activities.⁹

Some Bases for Compromise

If, for the sake of exploring alternatives, one goes back to Inglewood circa 1965, it appears that a number of specific matters provided some potential bases for cooperation. For example, Project Fifty Families was in principle a good idea. It failed for lack of community support. This could have been an instance in which the city council, school board, and community organizations cooperated in fostering a project of mutual benefit. Had the Morningside area gotten strong cooperation at an early stage, the progressive disenchantment and hardening of position leading up to a law suit might have been avoided.

Opposition to tracking, or ability grouping, was another position that might have united substantial segments of the community. Tracking works to the disadvantage of poor whites and blacks, groups that might otherwise be in opposition to one another. Additionally, it is the kind of issue that white liberals probably would support on ideological grounds, even though many of their children are in upper tracks.

Discipline was a matter of concern to most of the parents in the district. They wanted disciplinary procedures that discriminated neither against the black minority nor the white majority. The real division of opinion was over the means to be utilized. Some people favored stricter discipline, whereas others advocated "softer" solutions such as in-service training for teachers. Had the school board publicized the commonality of interests and taken affirmative action of both kinds, it might have reduced tensions and reduced the number of people who were leaving because of concern about discipline in the schools.

Finally, among the parents, at least, there probably would have been support for a general upgrading of the educational system. The superintendent tried to generate community support for upgrading within the CAC, but this came at a time when school desegregation was the overriding issue. Substantial change for the purpose of improving the quality of education (which was a matter of some pride to the people of Inglewood) would have received far more support in 1965 than it did in 1969.

CONCLUSIONS

These proposals seem plausible. They would certainly have a better potential for success than the alternative strategies attempted

in Inglewood and that proposed by the preemptive theorists. Yet, one is ultimately left pessimistic. The particular choices made by one local school board in one community appear trivial in light of the force of black expansion across the Los Angeles basin.

At another level, the personalities, ideologies, and competencies of the particular actors might have ruled out certain alternatives. On this one cannot comment. Most of the school board members did not explore all alternatives, and had they been made aware of them there is at least a chance they would have acted differently.

More problematic is the degree to which the events in Inglewood were politically predetermined. This may be so at two levels: the structure of power and the structure of interests. In regard to power a number of studies (including the work of those who have been called preemptive theorists) have suggested that it is only in communities with powerful elites that clear decisions can be made. Inglewood, lacking a strong power elite, may have been doomed to indecision.

Second, the alternatives explored depend on the existence of some shared interests, so that the pursuit of self-interest may be developed as a motive source for action by the community. It is possible, however, that the areas of shared interest simply do not outweigh the costs of joint action. In other words, it is possible that moving out is the best alternative open to most families regardless of any actions by the community.

In the first instance, although one may generally accept the findings concerning the importance of strong elites, communities lacking well-developed elites should not be simply abandoned. Participation is proposed as an alternative approach to the problem of garnering enough support for action, especially for school boards that do not have other sources of support.

The second problem of political determinism cannot here be answered. If indeed a satisfactory compromise cannot be found that Inglewood residents feel they could live with, there is little hope at the community level. Only a metropolitan solution is left.

For the reasons indicated the Inglewood leaders were not prepared to modify their procedures or take the kinds of steps proposed here. Given who they were and the climate of opinion within which they operated, it is unreasonable to have expected them to behave differently. Alternatives in the Inglewood situation have been looked at not for the purpose of second-guessing but rather to use this concrete case as an example of a new kind of local policy-making environment that must be understood and controlled.

Although the court suit against the Inglewood school district was dismissed in May 1969, the judge made it clear that, unless the district took affirmative action on a desegregation plan in the 1969-70 school year, they would be ordered to do so. In early June a new planning effort was begun by the school administration. This culminated in a desegregation plan submitted to the school board in late October. The plan called for pairing at the elementary level and changes in feeder patterns at the secondary level to be phased in over a five-year period. Once again, the community divided on the issue; the school board rejected the plan by a 4-1 vote in December.

In March 1970 a group of parents filed a new suit against the district. In response the superintendent issued a public statement opposing bussing for the purpose of achieving racial balance. The court hearing was held in May; in July 1970 a superior court judge ordered the district to produce a desegregation plan to be put in operation with the opening of schools in September. He noted that, although feasible desegregation plans were available, the board deliberately chose not to take action.

Three days later the school board met. The members were advised by their lawyer that in all probability an appeal would be unsuccessful. They decided against appeal by a 4-1 vote and directed an administrative task force to draw up a plan. In early August a plan costing \$64,300 was approved. It called for elementary school pairing, the redrawing of secondary school boundaries along an east-west axis, and voluntary bussing. Desegregation at the junior high level was to be completed by 1972, and at the senior high level it was to be completed by 1974. Later in the month, a petition asking the board to appeal, and signed by more than 3,000 persons, was submitted.

On September 3 the plan was accepted by the court; schools opened without major incidents ten days later. Then, a week later, the board reversed its earlier decision. By a 3-2 vote, it decided to appeal the court order. In late October a member of the board changed his mind again, and plans for appeal were junked once and for all.

There was a major turnover of the school board in April 1971, when two new members were elected and a third was appointed to fill an unexpired term. As a whole the board became somewhat more activist, but the balance among liberals, moderates, and conservatives remained much as it had been before.

DEADLOCK IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

A major argument of this book has been that significant latent social and political instability remains in a community even after a desegregation decision has been implemented. This was confirmed in a dramatic way when, in August, 1972, the Inglewood Board of Education voted to rescind busing and ordered the district administration to find ways to return to the concept of the neighborhood school. This action, and a decision earlier in the summer to discharge the superintendent, apparently reflect dissatisfaction with the entire desegregation program among both conservative and liberal school board members.

Community leaders expressed the same concerns that were present during our interviews years earlier. They spoke of the substantial spread of black student population throughout the district, the ongoing attachment to the neighborhood school among white and black parents, and the problems encountered in trying to achieve quality education.

The unprecedented decision of the Inglewood board undoubtedly stems also from currents of opposition to busing in national politics. The ousted superintendent said that, "This all started with the Nixon declarations on busing. They really warmed things up in Inglewood. It reflects the tempo of the nation to try to stop busing." (L. A. Times, August 13, 1972)

The forthcoming policy still must be approved by the courts; and it will not, if only because of the spreading black population, mean a swing back to de facto segregated schools. Seven years after the issue first surfaced, the Inglewood school leadership begins a new search for programs that are responsive to the real needs of Inglewood's students and parents. Perhaps after all these years there is, at least, a recognition that this, in fact, is what must be done.

TABLE 5

Increase in Proportion of Blacks in Inglewood Schools
Between 1970 and 1971
(percent)

School	1970		1971	
	White	Black	White	Black
Total Elementary School	75	25	66	34
Crozier Junior High	86	14	73	27
Monroe Junior High	54	46	47	53
Total Junior High	71	29	60	40
Inglewood High	92	8	83	17
Morningside High	58	42	43	57
Total Senior High	78	22	67	33

Source: Inglewood Daily News, October 13, 1971.

When the schools opened in September 1971, it became apparent that, although vocal opposition to desegregation had declined, the resegregation process in the schools was proceeding rapidly. Between 1970 and 1971 the proportion of blacks in the schools increased from 25 percent to 35 percent. Table 5 gives a more detailed breakdown.

CHAPTER 1

1. See Robert A. Dentler, "Barriers to Northern School Desegregation," Daedalus, XCV (Winter 1966), pp. 45-63; Roscoe Hill and Malcolm Feeley, eds., Affirmative School Integration: Efforts to Overcome De Facto Segregation in Urban Schools (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1968), p. 91; and Raymond Mack, ed., Our Children's Burden: Studies of Desegregation in Nine American Communities (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 446-51; U.S., Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, I of 2 volumes (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 140-46.
2. Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, p. 140.
3. E.g., David Rogers and Bert Swanson, "White Citizen Response to the Same Integration Plan: Comparisons of Local School Districts in a Northern City," Sociological Inquiry, XXXV (Winter, 1965), pp. 107-22.
4. James Coleman et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: Office of Education, 1966), p. 302.
5. Racial Isolation, pp. 1-2.
6. This concept was developed by Gunnar Myrdal in An American Dilemma (New York: Harper, 1944), Appendix 3.
7. This idea derives from George Homans, The Human Group (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 110-13.
8. Cf. Coleman et al., Equality.
9. E.g., Robert L. Crain, The Politics of School Desegregation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), pp. 111-12.
10. Robert T. Stout, "School Desegregation: Progress in Eight Cities," paper delivered to National Conference on Equal Educational Opportunity in American Cities (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1967).
11. This idea has received some attention in connection with issues other than school desegregation: cf. Robert L. Crain, Elihu Katz, and Donald B. Rosenthal, The Politics of Community Conflict: The Fluoridation Decision (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); William A. Gamson, "Rancorous Conflict in Community Politics," American Sociological Review, XXXI (February 1966).
12. Stout, "School Desegregation: Progress in Eight Cities," p. 13.
13. Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Continuing Barriers to Desegregated

Education in the South," Sociology of Education, XXXVIII (Winter 1965), p. 109.

14. Inger and Stout, "School Desegregation," p. 38.
15. Ibid.
16. Crain, Politics, pp. 207-12.
17. Ibid., pp. 159-76.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., pp. 180-81.
20. Ibid., p. 174.
21. Ibid., pp. 170, 201-2.
22. Ibid., pp. 216-32.
23. Stout and Sroufe, "Politics Without Power."
24. Racial Isolation, pp. 145-46.
25. Ibid., pp. 154-63.
26. Ibid., pp. 8-10.
27. Ibid., Ch. 3.
28. Ibid., p. 39.
29. Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Urban Integration: The Metropolitan Educational Park Concept," in Arthur M. Kroll, ed., Issues in American Education (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 118-38.
30. Racial Isolation, pp. 151-54.
31. See Rosalind J. Dworkin, "Segregation and Suburbia," in Mack Children's Burden, pp. 189-234.
32. Stout and Sroufe, "Politics Without Power."
33. See John E. Coons, "Evanston," in Hill and Feeley, Affirmative School Integration.
34. Donald H. Bouma and James Hoffman, The Dynamics of School Integration (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1968).
35. See Reginald G. Damerall, Triumph in a White Suburb (New York: William Morrow, 1968).

CHAPTER 2

1. University of Southern California, Class in City and Regional Planning, "Inglewood Planning Study" (1963), p. 2.
2. Inglewood Planning Commission "General Plan," Inglewood, California (Inglewood, January 1968), p. 6.
3. Inglewood Planning Study, p. 1.
4. Ibid., pp. 38-40.
5. General Plan, p. 3.
6. This pamphlet is entitled "Harbor of the Air: Inglewood, California."
7. Inglewood Planning Study, p. 46.
8. Ibid., p. 16.
9. General Plan, p. 9.

10. For all details concerning the use of census materials, including the correspondence between neighborhoods and census tracts, see the Appendix.
11. Inglewood Planning Study, p. 1.
12. From the census; see the Appendix.
13. From the census; see the Appendix.
14. Karl E. and Alma F. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities (Chicago: Aldine, 1965), p. 7.
15. Ibid., pp. 102-6.
16. Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris, Minorities in the New World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 144-45.
17. The sheet is entitled, "Project Fifty Families: Fact Sheet."

CHAPTER 3

1. See the Appendix.
2. U.S., Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, I of 2 volumes (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), Appendix C, p. 182.
3. Ibid., Appendix C, p. 182.
4. Harry C. Miller and Roger Woock, Social Foundations of Urban Education (Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1970), pp. 358-66.
5. Racial Isolation, Appendix C.
6. California Department of Education, "Report of Bureau of Intergroup Relations" (Inglewood, June 1968), p. 34.
7. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
8. Ibid., p. 23.
9. Ibid., p. A-5.
10. Racial Isolation, Appendix A, p. 43.
11. "Integration at M.H.S.: September, 1963 to March, 1968" (unpublished manuscript, 1968).
12. Ibid.
13. Report of Bureau of Intergroup Relations, pp. 11-12.
14. Ibid., p. 2.
15. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
16. Speech by member of Inglewood Board of Education, February 24, 1969.

CHAPTER 4

1. See Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1959), Ch. 5; and Harry Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical Association (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1960).

2. James Coleman, Community Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957), describes how in conflict situations traditional leadership groups may surrender power to ad hoc groups.
3. See Howard Elinson, "Folk Politics" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1969).
4. See Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Watenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1970).
5. Robert E. Agger and Marshall N. Goldstein, Who Will Rule the Schools: A Cultural Class Crisis (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971).
6. Elinson, "Folk Politics."
7. Agger and Goldstein, Who Will Rule, find the same distrust of school leaders.
8. Speech to the Inglewood Board of Education, February 24, 1969.

CHAPTER 5

1. This brochure is available from the Department of Education, State of California, Sacramento, California.
2. California Department of Education, "Report of Bureau of Intergroup Relations" (Inglewood, June, 1968), p. 34.
3. Ibid., pp. 55-60.
4. Inglewood Daily News, August 4, 1968.
5. Inglewood Unified School District recommendations on Bureau of Intergroup Relations report, August 5, 1968.
6. Inglewood Daily News, August 13, 1968.
7. Minutes of the Meeting, Inglewood Board of Education, February 5, 1969.
8. Staff report, April 16, 1969.
9. Citizens Advisory Committee, "Implementing a 6-3-3 Plan," Administrative Staff Report, April 24, 1969.
10. Data from Inglewood Daily News, April 4, 1969.
11. Robert T. Stout and Gerald E. Sroufe, "Politics Without Power: The Dilemma of a Local School System," Phi Delta Kappan, XLIX, 6, p. 344.

CHAPTER 6

1. Robert E. Warren and Louis Weschler point out that this is true of many policy areas. In an article to be published soon, "Governing Urban Space: Non-Territorial Politics" (p. 7), they conclude that "Most analyses of city politics and the mental frames of local officials utilize models which are based on 19th century technology. This city exists in finite space with boundaries that are or can be made to be impermeable to external effects, except those that are legally sanctioned . . . The models assume

DEADLOCK IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

residential stability, neighborhood loyalties, areally-based political organizations and a set of boundaries which encompass all or most of the urbanized population of the area."

2. See Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1960), Ch. 2; and Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Non-decisions: An Analytical Framework," American Political Science Review, LVIII, 3 (September 1963), 632-42.

3. Robert E. Agger and Marshall N. Goldstein, Who Will Rule the Schools: A Cultural Class Crisis (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971), p. 207.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

5. Talcott Parsons, "Polarization of the World and International Order," in Quincy Wright, William M. Evan, and Morton Deutsch, eds., Preventing World War III (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 310-31, suggests that this is one precondition for orderly conflict resolution.

6. Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 225-27.

7. Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), pp. 325-27.

8. Los Angeles Times, January 31, 1972.

9. "Round-up Report: How Schools Meet Desegregation Challenges," The Nation's Schools, LXXVIII, 5 (1966), 69.

APPENDIX:
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE
ON OVERLAPPING
BOUNDARIES

Data on neighborhoods were derived from a number of sources, each of which had a somewhat different way of dividing up the map of the school district. These included the following:

1. School District—dividing the city plus Ladera Heights into 13 elementary school attendance zones. There are a few small sections in the southern part of the city that are not part of the school district. These were disregarded.

2. 1960 Census—dividing the city into 16 census tracts. This census information was obtained from the Planning Department of Inglewood. It did not include Ladera Heights and did include Lennox, which shares some of the southeastern tracts with Inglewood. Some of the tracts overlap "natural" neighborhoods, e.g., one tract encompasses Imperial Village but is also half in Morningside Heights. Generally, the data from this census were in the form of fairly broad ranges.

3. 1969 Census—dividing the city into 20 census tracts. This mainly entailed subdividing some of the bigger tracts and omitting Lennox. Data were collected from Ladera Heights, but the school district had not expressed interest in the Ladera Heights data, and it had not been tabulated.

4. 1970 Census—dividing the city into 19 tracts, plus two tracts that include Ladera Heights but are not coterminous with it. These data were procured from a different source, enabling some indication of the characteristics of Ladera Heights. The city tracts correspond to the 1969 divisions, with one exception.

5. Voting Precincts for 1968 and 1970. These were detatched with the 1970 census data and had been aligned with them. The correspondence was not exact, however.

In presenting the data it was felt that for ease of understanding the city would be treated as a set of nine neighborhoods, using the

divisions that Inglewood residents themselves considered to be important. Needless to say, these did not correspond exactly with any of the above. In some cases it was still possible to calculate information more or less precisely (as in Table 1, where the exception of Ladera Heights is a product of the fact that the census tract is larger than the neighborhood).

In Table 2 the information is approximate because of problems created by combining data from census tracts. The median income data could be more easily combined because there is a precise figure for both censuses. An approximate neighborhood median was calculated by controlling for population. The median value of homes was more problematic because the original data were in the form of ranges. In combining tracts the full combined range has simply been presented. For example, if a neighborhood consisted of two census tracts, one with median values of \$25,000-30,000 and the other of \$30,000-35,000, the median was presented as \$25,000-35,000.

- Agger, Robert E., and Marshall N. Goldstein. Who Will Rule the Schools: A Cultural Class Crisis. Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971.
- Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," American Political Science Review, LVII, 3 (September 1963), 632-42.
- Boulding, Kenneth. Conflict and Defense. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963.
- Bouma, Donald H. and James Hoffman. The Dynamics of School Integration. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1968.
- California Department of Education. "Report of Bureau of Intergroup Relations." Inglewood, June 1968.
- Coleman, James. Community Conflict. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957.
- _____. et al. Equality of Educational Opportunity. Washington, D.C.: Office of Education, 1966.
- Crain, Robert L. The Politics of School Desegregation. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1969.
- _____, and David Street. "School Desegregation and School Decision-Making," Urban Affairs Quarterly, II (1966), 64-82.
- _____, Elihu Katz, and Donald B. Rosenthal. The Politics of Community Conflict: The Fluoridation Decision. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1959.
- Damerall, Reginald G. Triumph in a White Suburb. New York: William Morrow, 1968.

- Dentler, Robert A. "Barriers to Northern School Desegregation," Daedalus, XCV (Winter 1966), 45-63.
- Eckstein, Harry. Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical Association. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1960.
- Elinson, Howard. "Folk Politics." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1969.
- Gamson, William A. "Rancorous Conflict in Community Politics," American Sociological Review, XXXI (February 1966).
- Hill, Roscoe, and Malcolm Feeley, eds. Affirmative School Integration: Efforts to Overcome De Facto Segregation in Urban Schools. Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1968.
- Homans, George. The Human Group. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957.
- Inger, Morton, and Robert T. Stout. "School Desegregation: The Need to Govern," The Urban Review, III (November 1968), 35-38.
- Inglewood Planning Commission. "General Plan, Inglewood, California." Inglewood, January 1968.
- Mack, Raymond, ed. Our Children's Burden: Studies of Desegregation in Nine American Communities. New York: Random House, 1968.
- Miller, Harry C., and Roger Woock. Social Foundations of Urban Education. Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1970.
- Myrdal, Gunnar. An American Dilemma. New York: Harper, 1944.
- Parsons, Talcott. "Polarization of the World and International Order." Preventing World War III. Edited by Quincy Wright, William M. Evan, and Morton Deutsch. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962.
- Pettigrew, Thomas F. "Continuing Barriers to Desegregated Education in the South," Sociology of Education, XXXVIII (Winter 1965), 109.

- _____. "Urban Integration: The Metropolitan Educational Park Concept." Issues in American Education. Edited by Arthur M. Kroll. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Rogers, David, and Bert Swanson. "White Citizen Response to the Same Integration Plan: Comparisons of Local School Districts in a Northern City," Sociological Inquiry, XXXV (Winter 1965), 107-22.
- "Round-up Report: How Schools Meet Desegregation Challenges," The Nation's Schools, LXXVIII, 5 (1966), 69.
- Scammon, Richard M., and Ben J. Watenberg. The Real Majority. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1970.
- Stout, Robert T. "School Desegregation: Progress in Eight Cities." Paper delivered to National Conference on Equal Educational Opportunity in American Cities Washington, D. C., U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1967.
- _____, and Gerald Sroufe. "Politics Without Power: The Dilemma of a Local School System," Phi Delta Kappan, XLIX, 6 (1968), 342-45.
- Taeuber, Karl E. and Alma F. Negroes in Cities. Chicago: Aldine, 1965.
- U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Racial Isolation in the Public Schools. Vol. 1 of 2 volumes, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1967.
- University of Southern California, Class in City and Regional Planning. "Inglewood Planning Study," 1963.
- Vidich, Arthur J., and Joseph Bensman. Small Town in Mass Society. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1960.
- Wagley, Charles, and Marvin Harris. Minorities in the New World. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.
- Warren, Robert E., and Louis Weschler. "Governing Urban Space: Non-Territorial Politics." Unpublished Study.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

EDNA BONACICH is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of California at Riverside. Although born in the United States, Dr. Bonacich received much of her schooling in South Africa, where she developed her prime interest in race and ethnic relations.

Dr. Bonacich received her Ph.D. from the Social Relations Department at Harvard University. She is currently working on a survey of Japanese-Americans and a general theory of race relations.

ROBERT F. GOODMAN is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Southern California, where he teaches courses in the fields of American national and urban politics and research methods. In addition to his interest in school desegregation he has conducted research in the areas of political parties and simulation-gaming.

Dr. Goodman spent one year as a post-doctoral fellow at System Development Corporation and earned his Ph.D. in political science from U.C.L.A.



INGLEWOOD BUSING

Continued from First Page

"I guess if you are a 'minority' student in the district today you would be a Caucasian," Deutz told the hearing. "It's something none of us could have avoided."

He said the ethnic transformation of the Inglewood schools had begun before he ordered integration. Deutz acknowledged that "some people say the plan caused it and it might have been a factor but certainly not the predominant factor."

The school board itself asked to continue busing between two schools, La Tijera and Freeman, for purposes of ethnic balance, and Deutz agreed.

All elementary schools had been "paired" under the Inglewood plan. When schools are paired, students in kindergarten through third grade go to one and pupils in fourth through sixth attend the other.

Deutz reserved a decision on two other schools that also are currently paired. The district plans to turn one, located in an Anglo area, into a "magnet" school with exemplary programs to attract minority students and maintain ethnic balance. It is Parent School.

But Deutz said he wants to see evidence of the district's intentions to do this and set another hearing for May 23, although he indicated that in the end, he would probably include these schools as well in his order vacating the plan.

Deutz also allowed the district to return attendance boundaries of junior and senior high schools to their pre-1970 locations.

In all cases, elimination of the plan will have little effect on the existing ethnic balance at Inglewood's schools, he noted.

Dropping of the integration plan was not opposed by the Western Center on Law and Poverty, which brought the original suit against the district on behalf of minority parents.

Deutz said he received a letter from the NAACP, Inglewood branch, opposing the board's request on grounds the district had not tried to make the plan work while it was in effect. Also, the letter said abandonment would threaten district eligibility for some federal funds.

"The only point with that as far as segregation is concerned, either there is or there isn't," Deutz said. He said the problems mentioned in the letter were outside his authority to remedy.

"It's pretty much a matter of statistics," he said. "I don't have a great deal of latitude here."

Deutz also said he was concerned about the cost of busing to the district, which school officials estimated at about \$300,000 a year.

"I want to do whatever I can to alleviate the economics of the plan," he said. "There is no question busing placed a great burden on the district."

Deutz ordered the district to integrate the schools after finding that they were heavily segregated. In 1970, when he issued his order, the district was 62% Anglo and 38% minority.

In 1971, it was 52% Anglo and 48% minority. Then in 1972, the balance tipped with minority enrollment reaching 59% and 41% Anglo.

The minority percentage rose to 70% in 1973, 79% in 1974 and 80% this year. The current ethnic breakdown in enrollment is 70.8% black, 19.5% Anglo, 7.7% Mexican-American, 1.7% Asian-American and .3% American Indian.

The city of Inglewood is still predominantly Anglo. However, much

★ Los Angeles Times 21
Sat., May 10, 1975—Part I

of the Anglo population is older and childless, while some younger Anglo parents send their children to private schools.

State officials said they believe Inglewood is the first district in the nation allowed to abandon a desegregation plan ordered by a court.

There have been legal attempts elsewhere in the United States, so far unsuccessful, to maintain integration in districts like Inglewood by merging their pupils with pupils in adjoining districts that are mostly Anglo in enrollment.

In the only such test case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, involving the Detroit schools, the court refused to permit the crossing of school district boundaries to bring racial balance to schools.

In that case, the courts were being asked to force integration of Detroit's heavily black city schools with schools in the surrounding Anglo districts.

Court Terminates School Busing Plan in Inglewood

BY JACK McCURDY
Times Education Writer

The Inglewood city school district, its enrollment now 80% minority children—most of them black—was allowed Friday to drop a five-year-old court-ordered desegregation plan which required extensive crosstown busing to carry out.

The district, the first in California to integrate its schools under a state court order, is apparently the first in the nation to be granted permission to abandon court-imposed integration.

Superior Judge Max F. Deutz in a ruling from the bench lifted the integration order he made in 1970, saying "as a practical matter we are now busing black children from predominantly black schools to other predominantly black schools."

The district's 17 schools have gone from 60% Anglo to 80% black, Mexican-American and Asian-American since the plan went into effect. All were involved in the busing.

The return to neighborhood school attendance will take effect in September. The only remnant of the

plan apparently will be two schools to which students will still be bused for integration purposes.

Nearly every school in the district is now heavily minority in enrollment; even with the integration plan. None is predominantly Anglo.

A growing number of minority students have been bused to mostly minority schools for the last two years, a school spokesman said.

The Inglewood board made a determined attempt to persuade Deutz to drop the plan two years ago at a time when minority enrollment had reached 58%. But he refused.

Please Turn to Page 21, Col. 4

THE WEATHER

National Weather Service forecast: Mostly sunny today and Sunday with some late night and early morning low clouds. Highs both days about 75. High Friday 74; low, 55.

Complete weather information and smog report in Part 1, Page 24.

LA Times
May 10,